Clinical Trials: The Effects of Registries and Results Databases

Posted: 25 Jun 2007

See all articles by Matthias Dahm

Matthias Dahm

University of Leicester - Department of Economics

Paula Gonzalez

Universidad Pablo de Olavide

Nicolas Porteiro

University Pablo de Olavide

Date Written: June 1, 2007

Abstract

We provide a framework to analyze the incentives of pharmaceutical firms to generate scientific knowledge through clinical trials and investigate how these incentives are affected through different hotly debated regulatory environments. Our model can explain how the situations created by some of these environments triggered regulatory change and yields four key findings. First, a policy of full transparency -- which the medical literature promotes as the ideal scenario -- has a deterrence effect on the incentives to conduct clinical trials, as it reduces the firms' gains from trials. Second, a compulsory clinical trial registry complemented through a clinical trial results database can implement full transparency, provided the database is sufficiently comprehensive. Third, a clinical trial results database without a compulsory registry can, in principle, achieve full transparency without deterring trials and is, thus, a superior regulatory tool. Fourth, the effects of the regulations are to a large extent determined by the conditions under which product market competition takes place.

Keywords: interest groups, pharmaceutical firms, strategic information transmission, clinical trials, registries

JEL Classification: D72, I18, L15

Suggested Citation

Dahm, Matthias and Gonzalez, Paula and Porteiro, Nicolas, Clinical Trials: The Effects of Registries and Results Databases (June 1, 2007). iHEA 2007 6th World Congress: Explorations in Health Economics Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=995752

Matthias Dahm

University of Leicester - Department of Economics ( email )

Department of Economics
Leicester LE1 7RH, Leicestershire LE1 7RH
United Kingdom

Paula Gonzalez

Universidad Pablo de Olavide ( email )

Ctra. Utrera, Km.1
Sevilla, Seville 41010
Spain
+34 954 34 83 80 (Phone)
+34 954 34 93 39 (Fax)

Nicolas Porteiro (Contact Author)

University Pablo de Olavide ( email )

Ctra. Utrera, Km.1
Sevilla, Seville 41010
Spain

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