ASP On-Demand Versus MOTS In-House Software Solutions

15 Pages Posted: 28 Jun 2007

See all articles by Dan Ma

Dan Ma

Singapore Management University

Abraham Seidmann

Boston University - Questrom School of Business; University of Rochester - Simon Business School

Date Written: June 2007

Abstract

Application Service Providers (ASPs) deliver on-demand information processing services to user firms via the Internet. They have been an attractive alternative to purchasing, installing, and maintaining modifiable off-the-shelf (MOTS) software solutions. We study several critical aspects of a user firm's choice between an ASP and MOTS software. The competitive model considers heterogeneous users who differ in terms of their expected transaction volume, while ASPs and MOTS vendors differ in terms of their pricing structure, setup cost, system customization, and service level arrangement. Our results identify and characterize the equilibrium conditions under which ASPs and MOTS vendors can coexist in a competitive market, and they explain which firms could be the primary beneficiaries of each vendor type. We show that the value added by ASPs comes as much from the efficient pooling of transaction volatility risks as from the reduction in IT implementation costs. As users' transaction volatility increases, the competitive advantage of the ASP approach increases significantly. Our findings predict that the existence of ASPs would not be a temporary phenomenon. These new software deliverers are likely to compete, survive, and coexist with the traditional software vendors in the market.

Suggested Citation

Ma, Dan and Seidmann, Abraham Avi, ASP On-Demand Versus MOTS In-House Software Solutions (June 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=996774 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.996774

Dan Ma (Contact Author)

Singapore Management University ( email )

School of Information Systems
80 Stamford Road
Singapore 178901
Singapore

Abraham Avi Seidmann

Boston University - Questrom School of Business ( email )

595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States

University of Rochester - Simon Business School ( email )

Carol Simon Hall 3-333C
Rochester, NY 14627
United States
585-275-5694 (Phone)
585-275-9331 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ssb.rochester.edu/fac/Seidmannav/

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