Voluntary Disclosure Under Uncertainty About the Reporting Objective

Posted: 1 Jul 2007


The extensive research toward an understanding of corporate voluntary disclosure strategies has primarily aimed at explaining why firms do not fully disclose their private information in capital markets with rational expectations. Following a variety of theories that explain the withholding of information, this paper highlights the uncertainty of investors about the reporting objective of managers as another explanation. The paper also studies how uncertainty about the reporting objective interacts with other factors known to suppress disclosure, exploring that the common intuition regarding these factors does not always carry over to environments with an uncertain reporting objective.

Keywords: Financial accounting, Asymmetric information, Voluntary disclosure

JEL Classification: G14, G14, M41, M45

Suggested Citation

Einhorn, Eti, Voluntary Disclosure Under Uncertainty About the Reporting Objective. Journal of Accounting & Economics (JAE), Vol. 43, No. 2-3, 2007, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=997284

Eti Einhorn (Contact Author)

Tel Aviv University ( email )

P.O. Box 39010
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978

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