Effects on School Enrollment and Performance of a Conditional Cash Transfers Program in Mexico

44 Pages Posted: 29 Jun 2007

See all articles by Alain de Janvry

Alain de Janvry

University of California, Berkeley - The Richard & Rhoda Goldman School of Public Policy

Pierre Dubois

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Elisabeth Sadoulet

University of California, Berkeley - The Richard & Rhoda Goldman School of Public Policy

Date Written: January 2007

Abstract

We study the effects of a conditional cash transfers program on school enrollment and performance in Mexico. We provide a theoretical framework for analyzing the dynamic educational process including the endogeneity and uncertainty of performance at school (passing grades) and the effect of a cash transfer program conditional on school attendance. This framework is developed to study the Mexican social program Progresa (called now Oportunidades) in which a randomized experiment has been implemented and allows us to identify the effect of the program on enrollment and performance at school. Using the rules of the conditional program, we can explain the different incentive effects provided. We also derive the formal identifying assumptions needed to estimate consistently the average treatment effects on enrollment and performance at school. We find empirically that this program had always a positive impact on school continuation whereas for performance it had a positive impact at primary school but a negative one at secondary school (a possible consequence of disincentives due to the program termination after the third year of secondary school).

Keywords: Dynamic decisions, education demand, Mexico, randomized experiment, school performance, schooling decisions, transfer program, treatment effects

Suggested Citation

de Janvry, Alain and Dubois, Pierre and Sadoulet, Elisabeth, Effects on School Enrollment and Performance of a Conditional Cash Transfers Program in Mexico (January 2007). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 6069, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=997341

Alain De Janvry (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - The Richard & Rhoda Goldman School of Public Policy ( email )

2607 Hearst Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94720-7320
United States

Pierre Dubois

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) ( email )

Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France

Elisabeth Sadoulet

University of California, Berkeley - The Richard & Rhoda Goldman School of Public Policy ( email )

2607 Hearst Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94720-7320
United States

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