Mergers & Acquisitions in the U.S. Property-Liability Insurance Industry: Productivity and Efficiency Effects

Abstract

This paper analyzes the productivity and efficiency effects of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the U.S. property-liability insurance industry during the period 1994-2003 using data envelopment analysis (DEA) and Malmquist productivity indices. We seek to determine whether M&As are value-enhancing, value-neutral, or value-reducing. The analysis examines efficiency and productivity change for acquirers, acquisition targets, and non-M&A firms. We also examine the firm characteristics associated with becoming an acquirer or target through probit analysis. The results provide evidence that M&As in property-liability insurance were value-enhancing. Acquiring firms achieved more revenue efficiency gains than non-acquiring firms, and target firms experienced greater cost and allocative efficiency growth than non-targets. Factors other than efficiency enhancement are important factors in property-liability insurer M&As. Financially vulnerable insurers are significantly more likely to become acquisition targets, consistent with corporate control theory, and we also find evidence that M&As are motivated to achieve diversification. However, there is no evidence that scale economies played an important role in the insurance M&A wave.

Keywords: mergers, acquisitions, insurance, efficiency, data envelopment analysis, corporate control theory

JEL Classification: G22, G34, L11