Gift Exchange in a Multi-Worker Firm

26 Pages Posted: 8 Jul 2007

See all articles by Sandra Maximiano

Sandra Maximiano

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE)

Randolph Sloof

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics & Business (FEB); Tinbergen Institute

Joep Sonnemans

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE)

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Abstract

One of the main findings of a large body of gift exchange experiments is that a considerable fraction of workers reward higher wages with higher effort. These results are observed for simple one-employer-one-worker relationships. In this article we investigate whether they generalise to the more realistic situation in which the employer employs several workers. We compare a bilateral gift exchange game with a treatment in which each employer has four workers. We find that effort levels in the latter treatment are only marginally lower. Gift exchange thus appears to be robust to increases in the size of the workforce.

Suggested Citation

Maximiano, Sandra and Sloof, Randolph and Sonnemans, Joep, Gift Exchange in a Multi-Worker Firm. Economic Journal, Vol. 117, No. 522, pp. 1025-1050, July 2007, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=998150 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02065.x

Sandra Maximiano (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, North Holland 1018 WB
Netherlands

Randolph Sloof

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics & Business (FEB) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands
+31 20 525 5241 (Phone)
+31 20 525 4310 (Fax)

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands

Joep Sonnemans

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
1018 WB Amsterdam
Netherlands
+31 20 525 4249 (Phone)
+31 20 525 5283 (Fax)

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