Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

Are Some Negotiators Better than Others? Individual Differences in Bargaining Outcomes

39 Pages Posted: 6 Jul 2007 Last revised: 14 Jul 2008

Hillary Anger Elfenbein

Washington University in St. Louis, Olin School of Business

Jared R. Curhan

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

Noah Eisenkraft

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School

Aiwa Shirako

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business

Lucio Baccaro

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Date Written: June 12, 2007

Abstract

The authors address the long-standing mystery of stable individual differences in negotiation performance, for which intuition and conventional wisdom have clashed with inconsistent empirical findings. The present study used the Social Relations Model to examine individual differences directly via consistency in performance across multiple negotiations, and to disentangle the roles of both parties within these inherently dyadic interactions. Individual differences explained a substantial 25% and 46% of objective performance in distributive and integrative bargaining, respectively, and 19% of subjective performance. Previous work may have understated the influence of individual differences because conventional research designs require specific traits to be identified and measured. Exploratory analyses of a battery of specific existing traits revealed few reliable associations with consistent individual differences in performance. Limitations, areas for future research, and practical implications are discussed.

Keywords: negotiation, bargaining, individual differences, personality, subjective value

Suggested Citation

Elfenbein, Hillary Anger and Curhan, Jared R. and Eisenkraft, Noah and Shirako, Aiwa and Baccaro, Lucio, Are Some Negotiators Better than Others? Individual Differences in Bargaining Outcomes (June 12, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=998392 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.998392

Hillary Anger Elfenbein (Contact Author)

Washington University in St. Louis, Olin School of Business ( email )

One Brookings Drive
Campus Box 1133
St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
United States

Jared R. Curhan

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

50 Memorial Drive, E52-554
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-5219 (Phone)
617-253-2660 (Fax)

Noah Eisenkraft

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

Aiwa Shirako

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )

545 Student Services Building, #1900
2220 Piedmont Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

Lucio Baccaro

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) ( email )

77 Massachusetts Avenue
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
313
Rank
80,507
Abstract Views
1,570