Social and Economic Determinants of Turkish Voter Choice in the 1995 Parliamentary Election

34 Pages Posted: 10 Jul 2007

See all articles by Ali Akarca

Ali Akarca

University of Illinois at Chicago - Department of Economics

Aysit Tansel

Middle East Technical University (METU) - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Economic Research Forum (ERF)

Date Written: June 2007

Abstract

1995 Turkish parliamentary election was held almost under the conditions of a controlled experiment. The unique cross-section data pertaining to this election is utilized to study the voter behavior in Turkey. Turkish voters are found to take government's economic performance into account but not look back beyond one year. A poor performance is found to benefit the extremist opposition parties at the expense of the major incumbent party. The minor incumbent and the centrist opposition parties appear to be unaffected by economic conditions. Voters also exhibit a tendency to vote against the parties holding power. The party preferences of Turkish voters depend on their socioeconomic characteristics as well.

Keywords: elections, voter behavior, economic voting, party preference, Turkey

JEL Classification: D72

Suggested Citation

Akarca, Ali and Tansel, Aysit, Social and Economic Determinants of Turkish Voter Choice in the 1995 Parliamentary Election (June 2007). IZA Discussion Paper No. 2881, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=999528

Ali Akarca (Contact Author)

University of Illinois at Chicago - Department of Economics ( email )

725 University Hall (UH)
Chicago, IL 60607-7121
United States

Aysit Tansel

Middle East Technical University (METU) - Department of Economics ( email )

Inonu Bulvari
Ankara 06800
Turkey
90 312 210 2073 (Phone)
90 312 210 7964 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Economic Research Forum (ERF) ( email )

21 Al-Sad Al-Aaly St.
(P.O. Box: 12311)
Dokki, Cairo
Egypt

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