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Reasons: Practical and Adaptive

23 Pages Posted: 11 Jul 2007  

Joseph Raz

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law; Columbia University - Law School; King's College London – The Dickson Poon School of Law

Date Written: July 2007

Abstract

The paper argues that normative reasons are of two fundamental kinds, practical which are value related, and adaptive, which are not related to any value, but indicate how our beliefs and emotions should adjust to fit how things are in the world. The distinction is applied and defended, in part through an additional distinction between standard and non-standard reasons (for actions, intentions, emotions or belief).

Keywords: Jurisprudence, Reasons, Normative reasons

Suggested Citation

Raz, Joseph, Reasons: Practical and Adaptive (July 2007). Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12/2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=999870 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.999870

Joseph Raz (Contact Author)

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law ( email )

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Oxford, OX1 3UJ
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://josephnraz.googlepages.com/home

Columbia University - Law School ( email )

435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States

HOME PAGE: http://josephnraz.googlepages.com/home

King's College London – The Dickson Poon School of Law ( email )

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London, WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

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