Table of Contents

They Who Must Not Be Identified - Distinguishing Personal from Non-Personal Data Under the GDPR

Michèle Finck, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, University of Oxford
Frank Pallas, TU Berlin - Information Systems Engineering

Are Equity Crowdfunding Investors Active Investors?

Lars Hornuf, University of Bremen - Faculty of Business Studies and Economics, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Tobias Schilling, Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Law
Armin Schwienbacher, SKEMA Business School

Unité De L’Art Is Here to Stay - Cofemel and Its Consequences

Annette Kur, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

No Face, No Name, No Shame? Overcoming Barriers to Intra-Organizational Public Knowledge-Seeking

Maren Mickeler, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Business Administration (Munich School of Management)
Pooyan Khashabi, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Institute for Strategy, Technology and Organization (ISTO)
Marco Kleine, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
Tobias Kretschmer, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Business Administration (Munich School of Management), Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)


MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INNOVATION & COMPETITION
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"They Who Must Not Be Identified - Distinguishing Personal from Non-Personal Data Under the GDPR" Free Download
Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 19-14

MICHÈLE FINCK, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, University of Oxford
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FRANK PALLAS, TU Berlin - Information Systems Engineering
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In this article, we examine the concept of non-personal data from a law and computer science perspective. The delineation between personal data and non-personal data is of paramount importance to determine the GDPR’s scope of application. This exercise is, however, fraught with difficulty, also when it comes to de-personalised data – that is to say data that once was personal data but has been manipulated with the goal of turning it into anonymous data. This article charts that the legal definition of anonymous data is subject to uncertainty. Indeed, the definitions adopted in the GDPR, by the Article 29 Working Party and by national supervisory authorities diverge significantly. Whereas the GDPR admits that there can be a remaining risk of identification even in relation to anonymous data, others have insisted that no such risk is acceptable. A review of the technical underpinnings of anonymisation that is subsequently applied to two concrete case studies involving personal data used on blockchains, we conclude that there always remains a residual risk when anonymisation is used. The concluding section links this conclusion more generally to the notion of risk in the GDPR.

"Are Equity Crowdfunding Investors Active Investors?" Free Download
Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 19-15
CESifo Working Paper No. 7884

LARS HORNUF, University of Bremen - Faculty of Business Studies and Economics, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
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TOBIAS SCHILLING, Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Law
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ARMIN SCHWIENBACHER, SKEMA Business School
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It is often assumed that entrepreneurs retain more control of their venture when they opt for equity crowdfunding as compared to venture capital, notably because crowd investors are passive. We study whether crowd investors are indeed passive by analysing the cash flow and control rights crowd investors receive in equity crowdfunding in Germany, where more flexible contracts are offered than in many other countries. We document that in Germany many of the rights used in venture capital investment contracts are also used in equity crowdfunding contracts. We find that crowd investors are asked to pay higher prices if they receive more cash flow and exit rights, consistent with the fact that these rights are valuable to the crowd. However, these rights have no meaningful economic impact, since they do not affect campaign outcome, the likelihood of securing follow-on funding, nor the likelihood of liquidation of the venture. These results are inconsistent with control rights theory that predicts positive impacts, in contrast to results documented for venture capital contracts. Rather, our results suggest that crowd investors are passive investors whose control rights are ineffective or not exercised.

"Unité De L’Art Is Here to Stay - Cofemel and Its Consequences" Free Download
Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 19-16

ANNETTE KUR, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
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In Cofemel the CJEU declared that the criteria for assessing whether subject matter is protected as a work under copyright law are the same for design objects (“works of applied art?) as for other work categories. While the CJEU tries to indicate that the “unité de l’art?-approach thus adopted does not result in a near-complete cumulation of protection under copyright and design law, it is difficult to see how that could work in practice. Rather than relying on non-transparent and inconsistent differentiation schemes the recommendable strategy in response to the situation is to align the two fields as much as possible, in particular with regard to the respective catalogues of limitations.

"No Face, No Name, No Shame? Overcoming Barriers to Intra-Organizational Public Knowledge-Seeking" Free Download
Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 19-17

MAREN MICKELER, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Business Administration (Munich School of Management)
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POOYAN KHASHABI, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Institute for Strategy, Technology and Organization (ISTO)
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MARCO KLEINE, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
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TOBIAS KRETSCHMER, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Business Administration (Munich School of Management), Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
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While organizational platforms are becoming more prevalent for the integration and exchange of organizational knowledge, employee engagement remains a barrier for the success of these platforms. Extending socio-technical systems (STS) research, we focus on individual knowledge seeking in an organizational platform context. We follow a cost-benefit approach and argue that individual knowledge seeking is influenced by (a) economic cost concerns and (b) psychological cost considerations. To test our theoretical arguments, we run a lab experiment altering the costs associated with individuals’ decision to seek knowledge on the platform. While knowledge seeking is lowest in settings with both economic and psychological costs, we observe significant increases by (a) eliminating economic consequences, and (b) removing social psychological cost considerations by inducing anonymity on the platform. In addition, our results suggest the presence of gender-related differences in knowledge-seeking behavior on organizational platforms: Male participants are chiefly discouraged by economic considerations, while females place more emphasis on social considerations. Our results highlight the facilitating role of platform anonymity on employee engagement and have implications for the efficient design of these platforms.

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LAW RESEARCH CENTERS PAPERS

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Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law, Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
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Stanford Law School, Columbia Law School, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
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