Table of Contents

Crowdsourced Innovation: How Community Managers Affect Crowd Activities

Lars Hornuf, University of Bremen - Faculty of Business Studies and Economics, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Sabrina Jeworrek, Halle Institute for Economic Research, University of Magdeburg

Neighbouring Rights: In Search of a Dogmatic Foundation. The Press Publishers’ Case

Valentina Moscon, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Università degli Studi di Trento - Faculty of Law

Should There Be Lower Taxes on Patent Income?

Fabian Gaessler, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
Bronwyn H. Hall, University of California at Berkeley, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
Dietmar Harhoff, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Frand ADR Case Management Guidelines

Axel Walz, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
Claudia Feller, Independent
Matthias Zigann, Regional Court Munich I, Munich IP Dispute Resolution Forum
Peter Georg Picht, University of Zurich - Institute of Law, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
Raffael Probst, Munich IP Dispute Resolution Forum

The Impact of Brexit on Unitary Patent Protection and its Court

Matthias Lamping, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
Hanns Ullrich, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition


MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INNOVATION & COMPETITION
RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

"Crowdsourced Innovation: How Community Managers Affect Crowd Activities" Free Download
Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 18-16
CESifo Working Paper Series No. 7153

LARS HORNUF, University of Bremen - Faculty of Business Studies and Economics, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
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SABRINA JEWORREK, Halle Institute for Economic Research, University of Magdeburg
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In this study, we investigate whether and to what extent community managers in online collaborative communities can stimulate crowd activities through their engagement. Using a novel data set of 22 large online idea crowdsourcing campaigns, we find that active engagement of community managers positively affects crowd activities in an inverted U-shaped manner. Moreover, we evidence that intellectual stimulation by managers increases community participation, while individual consideration of users has no impact on user activities. Finally, the data reveal that community manager activities that require more effort, such as media file uploads instead of simple written comments, have a larger effect on crowd participation.

"Neighbouring Rights: In Search of a Dogmatic Foundation. The Press Publishers’ Case" Free Download
Forthcoming, T. Pihlajarinne, J. T. Vesala, O. Honkkila (eds), Online Distribution of Content, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018
Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 18-17

VALENTINA MOSCON, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Università degli Studi di Trento - Faculty of Law
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The European Commission proposal for new neighbouring rights for press publishers comes in the wake of a general trend of creating new “neighbouring rights?, as is the case, for instance, with sports events. Increasing recourse to neighbouring rights for the protection of different subject matter reveals that the underlying basic concepts are rather vague, calling for careful reflection on the legal nature of such rights and their relation to copyright.

This paper proposes to analyse whether protection of press publishers’ investment in producing and circulating news may be a task for intellectual property and precisely for neighbouring rights. After having highlighted the lack of a rationale for introducing press publishing neighbouring rights, tangential territories of law (i.e. copyright law, sui generis database protection, competition law and trademark law) will be identified as relevant in this field.

"Should There Be Lower Taxes on Patent Income?" Free Download
Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 18-18

FABIAN GAESSLER, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
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BRONWYN H. HALL, University of California at Berkeley, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
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DIETMAR HARHOFF, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
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A “patent box? is a term for the application of a lower corporate tax rate to the income derived from the ownership of patents. This tax subsidy instrument has been introduced in a number of countries since 2000. Using comprehensive data on patent filings at the European Patent Office, including information on ownership transfers pre? and post?grant, we investigate the impact of the introduction of a patent box on international patent transfers, on the choice of ownership location, and on invention in the relevant country. We find that the impact on transfers is small but present, especially when the tax instrument contains a development condition and for high value patents (those most likely to have generated income), but that invention itself is not affected. This calls into question whether the patent box is an effective instrument for encouraging innovation in a country, rather than simply facilitating the shifting of corporate income to low tax jurisdictions.

"Frand ADR Case Management Guidelines" Free Download
Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 18-19

AXEL WALZ, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
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CLAUDIA FELLER, Independent
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MATTHIAS ZIGANN, Regional Court Munich I, Munich IP Dispute Resolution Forum
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PETER GEORG PICHT, University of Zurich - Institute of Law, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
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RAFFAEL PROBST, Munich IP Dispute Resolution Forum
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The present FRAND ADR Case Management Guidelines are a product of open exchange and discussions with international institutions, practitioners and scholars. Crafted in a process that was designed to incorporate arguments and experiences from SEP holders and standard implementers, lawyers and engineers, judges, arbitrators and mediators, standard-setting organizations and public offices, the Guidelines consolidate the input of various stakeholder's representatives from the telecommunication and automotive sectors, interest groups and standardization organizations. The Guidelines aim to provide orientation for parties that are looking to utilize the benefits of ADR in an ongoing or upcoming FRAND dispute. They take the interests of patent holders and patent users as well as public policy implications into consideration. Their intention is to enable parties to agree to efficient and mutually beneficial proceedings, without influencing the material positions of either side. To assist parties in deciding on whether and under which circumstances FRAND disputes might be resolved by reference to ADR mechanisms, the Guidelines illustrate procedural options that are available at different stages of the process. Following an overview on standardization and ADR, section I of the Guidelines contains an introduction to the specific issues associated with SEP and FRAND disputes. Section II summarizes how FRAND disputes can be submitted to mediation, arbitration, expert determination or hybrid ADR procedures. Section III sets out principles for case management and offers guidance to parties and neutrals on which aspects to take into account. The Annexes summarize case law on the determination of FRAND terms and conditions and existing ADR soft law. Further, specific clauses have been developed which can be referred to by parties in order to increase transparency in FRAND determination disputes and to provide for the option of appealing an arbitral award.

"The Impact of Brexit on Unitary Patent Protection and its Court" Free Download
Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 18-20

MATTHIAS LAMPING, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
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HANNS ULLRICH, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
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Among the many problems Brexit raises in the field of European intellectual property those relating to the system of unitary patent protection stand out for their complex and controversial nature. The reason is that this system rests on two legally different but interconnected pillars: EU Reg. 1257/2012 on the implementation of enhanced cooperation by the creation of unitary patent protection on the one hand, and, on the other, the Agreement between the Member States of the EU on the establishment of a Unified Patent Court (UPC) that will have exclusive jurisdiction over invalidation and infringement actions concerning the European patent with unitary effect and/or the classic European (bundle) patent. However, the link between unitary protection of European patents and the UPC Agreement is not only one of jurisdiction, but also one of substantive law. Thus, as regards the rules on infringement of the unitary patent, Reg. 1257/2012 refers to those contained in the UPC Agreement in respect of the European (bundle) patent.

Many in the patent law community hope to overcome the disruptive effects the withdrawal of the UK from the EU will produce on both the territorial scope of unitary patent protection and on the UPC as a court common to EU Member States. However, unitary patent protection cannot be dissociated from the general legal order of the EU’s Internal Market and extended to the UK once it has left the Union. Any such extension is incompatible with the autonomous character of EU law and its institutions, will result in a legally split unity for separate and separately regulated markets, and conflict with both the UK’s and the EU’s public interests in defining and implementing a patent policy of their own. Since the core objective of the UPC Agreement is to establish for the adjudication of unitary patent protection a common court of EU Member States that, as such, forms part of the judicial system of the EU, continued participation in the UPC Agreement of the UK post Brexit will not be possible. It would be incompatible with the EU’s foundational principle, which is integration by virtue of the operation of an autonomous legal order based on a complete system of legal protection by national courts acting as ordinary courts of the Union and in cooperation with the Court of Justice of the EU.

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The Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper Series is a source for research papers authored by the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition academic staff (Eds.: Prof. Josef Drexl, Dir., Prof. Dietmar Harhoff, Exec. Dir., Prof. Reto M. Hilty, Dir.). Papers cover topics on intellectual property law (copyright, patent, trademark law), competition law (law of unfair competition, antitrust law), innovation research and entrepreneurship. To access all the papers in this series please use the following URL: http://ssrn.com/link/Max-Planck-Innovation-RES.html

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LAW RESEARCH CENTERS PAPERS

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