Table of Contents

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): Extending Trade Policy to Domestic Markets

Hanns Ullrich, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Position Statement of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition on the Proposed Modernisation of European Copyright Rules Part B Exceptions and Limitations (Art. 3 – Text and Data Mining)

Reto Hilty, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, University of Zurich, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich
Heiko Richter, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

The Economics of Replication

Frank Mueller-Langer, European Commission, Joint Research Center, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
Benedikt Fecher, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)
Dietmar Harhoff, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Gert G. Wagner, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), Berlin University of Technology, German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP)


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"The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): Extending Trade Policy to Domestic Markets" Free Download
Revue internationale de droit économique, Frühjahr 2017, Forthcoming
Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 17-01

HANNS ULLRICH, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
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While, due to the outcome of the presidential elections in the United States, the negotiations of an Agreement on a “Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)? between the European Union and the United States have been suspended sine die, the general political discussion and more particularly academic inquiry into the fundamental economic and legal issues TTIP raises will and must go on. The EU’s commercial policy continues to rely on bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) as a pillar of its international trade relations. The main feature of these new generation or “deep trade? agreements is that, in addition to the virtually complete elimination of customs tariffs and the reinforcement of trade facilitation measures at state borders, they institutionalize, intensify and expand regulatory cooperation between the parties as a way of reducing the trade restricting operation and effects of non-tariff, border-unspecific “technical barriers to trade? (TBT) in goods and services. Typically, they also complement such FTAs by an agreement on standards regarding the protection of matters of public policy, such as the protection of consumers or of the environment. As indicated by the name of the Canada – EU “Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement? (CETA), these FTAs thus become “comprehensive? in that they extend “behind the borders? and embrace the parties’ domestic market regulations, meaning that they aim at making the regulation of the parties’ internal markets “compatible? with a view to facilitating international trade or even at integrating these markets into a “deep integration? free trade area.

The reason for examining the legal issues that these new generation of free trade agreements raise by taking TTIP as an illustration is, that if concluded and put into operation as proposed by the EU, it would represent both the most advanced example of such FTAs and the first to have been agreed upon by economically equal and internationally competing “partners?. Therefore, it may be assumed that TTIP will be a model FTA functioning effectively, symmetrically and dynamically not only to the reciprocal advantage of the parties, but as a free trade area integrating the domestic markets concerned under the joint control by the parties. It is precisely this “deep integration? effect and the concomitant loss of sovereign and independent regulatory control by each party over the development of its domestic market and of democratic self-determination of the exercise of such autonomous control that triggered the broad public discussion of the political and legal desirability of TTIP or CETA and the likes.

However, the paper is not, at least not directly, concerned with the controversial issues of constitutional law and public policy underlying that general discussion. Rather, its focus is on understanding the preliminary question of what really constitutes the deep trade or integration character of an FTA. To this effect, the paper examines the mechanism and reach of regulatory cooperation, the tension existing between the reciprocity principle of trade agreements and the collaborative nature of regulatory cooperation, including the latter’s complementary rules on the protection of public interests, and, given the indivisibility of external and internal trade, the inherent conflict between a state’s sovereignty as regards the independent choice and the terms of its regulatory control over its domestic market on the one hand, and, on the other, the extension of an FTA’s regime to that domestic market regulation. Ultimately, by promoting deep trade FTAs and by multiplying them, a party’s commercial policy may come not only to pre-determine, but to dominate the definition of its domestic market regulation. Thus, as regards the EU, its commercial policy powers may tend to become themselves transformed into internal policy powers. In addition, the EU might become the victim of its own commercial strategy as it will increasingly be bound itself by the regime to which it binds its trade partners. Therefore, the adjournment of the TTIP project should not be seen as a loss of precious time, but as providing a period of reflection on the goals, terms and limits of the EU’s commercial policy regarding comprehensive free trade agreements.

"Position Statement of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition on the Proposed Modernisation of European Copyright Rules Part B Exceptions and Limitations (Art. 3 – Text and Data Mining)" Free Download
Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 17-02

RETO HILTY, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, University of Zurich, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich
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HEIKO RICHTER, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
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In Article 3 of the “Proposal for a Directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market COM(2016) 593 final? the European Commission suggests an exception for text and data mining (TDM). While, in principle, a clear legal framework for TDM is to be welcomed, the proposed provisions are to be criticized regarding their scope and the applied regulatory method. This Position Statement develops an alternative proposal: Since TDM is to be seen as a normal use of works and other protected subject-matter, a field exemption is suggested allowing everyone to carry out TDM related to lawfully accessible works or other subject-matter. This includes the permission to extract contents of databases and to make reproductions for the sole purpose of TDM. Moreover, research organizations also need to carry out TDM regarding content to which they do not have lawful access. The proposal includes a specific provision obliging rightholders who market works or other subject-matter primarily for research purposes to provide datasets suitable for TDM only, for which they may request a reasonable payment.

"The Economics of Replication" Free Download
Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 17-03

FRANK MUELLER-LANGER, European Commission, Joint Research Center, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
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BENEDIKT FECHER, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)
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DIETMAR HARHOFF, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
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GERT G. WAGNER, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), Berlin University of Technology, German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP)
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Replication studies are considered a hallmark of good scientific practice. Yet they are treated among researchers as an ideal to be professed but not practiced. To provide incentives and favorable boundary conditions for replication practice, the main stakeholders need to be aware of what drives replication. Here we investigate how often replication studies are published in empirical economics and what types of journal articles are replicated. We find that from 1974 to 2014 less than 0.1% of publications in the top-50 economics journals were replications. We do not find empirical support that mandatory data disclosure policies or the availability of data or code have a significant effect on the incidence of replication. The mere provision of data repositories may be ineffective, unless accompanied by appropriate incentives. However, we find that higher-impact articles and articles by authors from leading institutions are more likely to be subject of published replication studies whereas the replication probability is lower for articles published in higher-ranked journals.

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About this eJournal

The Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper Series is a source for research papers authored by the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition academic staff (Eds.: Prof. Josef Drexl, Dir., Prof. Dietmar Harhoff, Exec. Dir., Prof. Reto M. Hilty, Dir.). Papers cover topics on intellectual property law (copyright, patent, trademark law), competition law (law of unfair competition, antitrust law), innovation research and entrepreneurship. To access all the papers in this series please use the following URL: http://ssrn.com/link/Max-Planck-Innovation-RES.html

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