Table of Contents

Smart Contracts as a Form of Solely Automated Processing Under the GDPR

Michèle Finck, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, University of Oxford

Green Technology Diffusion: A Post-Mortem Analysis of the Eco-Patent Commons

Jorge L. Contreras, University of Utah - S.J. Quinney College of Law
Bronwyn H. Hall, University of California at Berkeley, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
Christian Helmers, Santa Clara University - Department of Economics

scopus: Scriptable Bibliometrics Using a Python Interface to Scopus

Michael E. Rose, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
John R. Kitchin, Carnegie Mellon University - Department of Chemical Engineering

Exclusionary Conduct in Data-Driven Markets: Limitations of Data Sharing Remedy

Vikas Kathuria, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
Jure Globocnik, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition


MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INNOVATION & COMPETITION
RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

"Smart Contracts as a Form of Solely Automated Processing Under the GDPR" Free Download
Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 19-01

MICHÈLE FINCK, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, University of Oxford
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This article examines the interaction between smart contracts and Article 22 GDPR. There is currently much debate regarding the potential of smart contracts. In spite of their name, this form of computer code is however neither necessarily smart nor a contract. I argue that they are, however, a form of solely automated data processing under Article 22(1) GDPR and subsequently examine the interaction between smart contracts and the European data protection framework to highlight uncertainties regarding the interpretation of the legal regime applying to solely automated forms of data processing under the GDPR.

"Green Technology Diffusion: A Post-Mortem Analysis of the Eco-Patent Commons" Free Download
Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 19-02
University of Utah College of Law Research Paper No. 297

JORGE L. CONTRERAS, University of Utah - S.J. Quinney College of Law
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BRONWYN H. HALL, University of California at Berkeley, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
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CHRISTIAN HELMERS, Santa Clara University - Department of Economics
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We revisit the effect of the “Eco-Patent Commons? (EcoPC) on the diffusion of patented environmentally friendly technologies following its discontinuation in 2016, using both participant survey and data analytic evidence. Established in January 2008 by several large multinational companies, the not-for-profit initiative provided royalty-free access to 248 patents covering 94 “green? inventions. Hall and Helmers (2013) suggested that the patents pledged to the commons had the potential to encourage the diffusion of valuable environmentally friendly technologies. Our updated results now show that the commons did not increase the diffusion of pledged inventions, and that the EcoPC suffered from several structural and organizational issues. Our findings have implications for the effectiveness of patent commons in enabling the diffusion of patented technologies more broadly.

"scopus: Scriptable Bibliometrics Using a Python Interface to Scopus" Free Download
Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 19-03

MICHAEL E. ROSE, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
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JOHN R. KITCHIN, Carnegie Mellon University - Department of Chemical Engineering
Email:

We present a wrapper for the Scopus RESTful API written for Python 3. The wrapper allows users to access the Scopus database via consistent and user-friendly interfaces and can be used without prior knowledge of RESTful APIs. To each of the Scopus APIs accessible for standard API keys there exists a class in scopus with consistent interfaces. Additionally, there is class to access restricted citation metadata. Files are cached to speed up subsequent analysis. The package addresses all users of Scopus data, such as researchers working in Science of Science or evaluators. It facilitates reproducibility of research projects and enhances data integrity for researchers using Scopus data.

"Exclusionary Conduct in Data-Driven Markets: Limitations of Data Sharing Remedy" Free Download
Forthcoming in: Marco Botta (ed.), EU Competition Law Remedies in Data Economy, Springer 2019
Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 19-04

VIKAS KATHURIA, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
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JURE GLOBOCNIK, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
Email:

The natural consequence of finding an infringement of Article 102 TFEU is to offset the harm to consumer welfare by restoring competition through effective remedies. As big data constitutes the most vital resource in data-driven markets, a dominant undertaking can exclude its rivals from accessing user data and thus deprive them of scale in markets that are characterised by network effects. Indeed, the European Commission found Google guilty of excluding its rivals in the Android licensing case by adopting this strategy. It is, however, unclear as to which remedy can most efficiently restore competition in such cases. This paper analyses the viability of mandatory data sharing as a remedy to restore competition in the affected market. The paper approaches this research question from both theoretical and practical standpoints. First, it analyses the viability of mandatory data sharing remedy from legal, economic and, technological perspective, followed by an assessment of such a remedy within the framework of the GDPR. Based on this comprehensive investigation, it concludes that mandatory data sharing is not the optimal solution to remedy loss to consumer welfare. In view of this, reliance can be placed on other behavioural and structural remedies.

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