MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INNOVATION & COMPETITION
RESEARCH PAPER SERIES
"The Limits of the GDPR in the Personalisation Context"
Forthcoming in: U. Kohl, J. Eisler (eds), Data-Driven Personalisation in Markets, Politics and Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021
Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 21-11
MICHÈLE FINCK, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, University of Oxford
Personalisation is both driven by, and can produce, personal data, and thus it falls within the scope of the General Data Protection Regulation ('GDPR'). As a consequence, the European data protection framework applies to data-driven personalisation. Yet, whereas there appears to be a general perception that data protection is suitable to function as a general legal framework for AI, it is important to remain realistic regarding both its opportunities and limitations. This chapter examines the application of certain elements of the GDPR to data-driven personalisation. There are hopes that the GPDR can serve as a general legal framework to govern the normative concerns that have emerged in relation to AI. It is, however, fundamentally inadequate to serve as a 'general AI law'. Whereas the Regulation indeed applies to the processing of personal data, it would be erroneous to frame it as a general 'AI law' capable of addressing all normative concerns around personalisation.
"Competition Law and Political Influence of Large Corporations – Antitrust Analysis and the Link between Political and Economic Institutions"
Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 21-12
FRANCISCO BENEKE, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
Economic policy determines the intensity of competition in markets. This gives incumbents the incentive to use their financial resources to influence policymaking in order to restrict competition and maintain or increase economic profits. Public authorities should promote that profits be used rather in welfare enhancing or neutral ways. Is competition law an adequate tool to promote this goal? This paper aims to ground the discussion on legal administrability considerations. The focus is therefore on whether we can design legal standards and identify evidence that courts can use to assess the tradeoffs between static efficiency, political influence of large corporations, and innovation. This paper argues that if political considerations are to be taken into account in antitrust analysis, these should be made explicit and looking at the evidence at hand in each case, in order to avoid enforcement guided by assumptions – such as that increases in market concentration always lead to risks in terms of political influence – that can otherwise be revised on a case-by-case basis.
"COVID-19 and the Role of Intellectual Property: Position Statement of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition of 7 May 2021"
Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 21-13
RETO HILTY, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, University of Zurich, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU)
PEDRO HENRIQUE D. BATISTA, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
SUELEN CARLS, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
DARIA KIM, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
MATTHIAS LAMPING, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
PETER R. SLOWINSKI, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
In this Statement, the authors take a position on the waiver of intellectual property (IP) protection currently being considered by the members of the World Trade Organisation. The waiver was initiated by India and South Africa as a measure to enable rapid access to affordable medical products that are necessary to combat Covid-19. The initiative gained momentum after the US decided to support it. The authors do not consider this path to be expedient. The Statement presents factual and legal arguments why a comprehensive waiver of IP protection is unlikely to be a necessary and suitable measure towards the pursued objective. Overall, it argues that IP rights may so far have played an enabling and facilitating rather than hindering role in overcoming Covid-19. The global community might not be better off if IP rights are waived, neither during nor after the pandemic. There are more efficient and direct ways to supply developing countries with vaccines quickly – if the industrialised countries are willing to do their share.
The Statement can be supported by filling in the form: https://forms.gle/c4kc8m9JE44AwjoJ7.
"The Complementarity of Drug Monitoring Programs and Health IT for Reducing Opioid-Related Mortality and Morbidity"
Forthcoming in: Health Economics
Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 21-14
LUCY XIAOLU WANG, University of Massachusetts Amherst - Department of Resource Economics, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
In response to the opioid crisis, each U.S. state has implemented a prescription drug monitoring program (PDMP) to collect data on controlled substances prescribed and dispensed in the state. I study whether health information technology (HIT) complements patient prescription data in PDMPs to reduce opioid-related mortality and morbidity. A novel dataset is constructed that records state policies that integrate PDMP with HIT and facilitate interstate data sharing. Using difference-in-differences models, I find that PDMP-HIT integration policies reduce opioid-related inpatient morbidity. The reductions are substantial in states that established integration without ever mandating the use of a PDMP. A mechanism test suggests that PDMP integration works mainly through the hospital system while a mandate affects legal opioids prescription. The impacts from integration are strongest for the vulnerable groups – middle-aged, low- to middle-income patients, and those with public insurance. There is suggestive evidence that interstate data sharing further complements integration despite not having a significant impact independently. The results are robust to a set of tests using alternative specifications and measures. The total benefits from integration far exceed the associated costs.
"No eureka! Incentives Hurt Creative Breakthrough Irrespective of the Incentives' Frame"
Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 21-15
MARCO KLEINE, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
We investigate the effect of financial incentives, framed as gains and losses, on creative breakthrough. Rather than originating merely from diligent work, creative breakthrough entails a eureka-moment – the sudden insight and the radical reorganization of ideas for the solution of a problem. We argue that financial incentives can be detrimental for creative breakthrough. Moreover, framing financial incentives as losses may lead to particularly strong detrimental effects, compared to incentives framed as gains. We test our hypotheses in a laboratory experiment using a classical paradigm to investigate creative breakthrough: the candle problem (Duncker 1945). We find causal evidence that, relative to a condition without performance-contingent incentives, financial incentives are counterproductive for creative breakthrough. This holds true for financial incentives framed as gains as well as for those framed as losses. We do not find any significant differences arising from the framing of incentiv