Table of Contents

Climate Policy Commitment Devices

Sebastian Dengler, Tilburg University, Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology, and Society (TILT), Tilburg University Department of Economics
Reyer Gerlagh, Tilburg University - Center and Faculty of Economics and Business Administration
Stefan Trautmann, Tilburg University
Gijs van de Kuilen, Tilburg University

Characterization and Implementation of Nash Bargaining Solutions with Non-Convexity

Cheng-Zhong Qin, University of California, Santa Barbara - Department of Economics
Guofu Tan, University of Southern California - Department of Economics
Adam Chi Leung Wong, Lingnan University - Department of Economics

A Note on 'All-Pay Auctions with Pre- and Post-Bidding Options'

Minbo Xu, Business School, Beijing Normal University
Sanxi Li, Toulouse School of Economics
Jianye Yan, University of International Business and Economics (UIBE) - School of Banking and Finance


GAME THEORY & BARGAINING THEORY eJOURNAL

"Climate Policy Commitment Devices" Free Download
FEEM Working Paper No. 49.2017

SEBASTIAN DENGLER, Tilburg University, Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology, and Society (TILT), Tilburg University Department of Economics
Email:
REYER GERLAGH, Tilburg University - Center and Faculty of Economics and Business Administration
Email:
STEFAN TRAUTMANN, Tilburg University
Email:
GIJS VAN DE KUILEN, Tilburg University
Email:

We develop a dynamic resource extraction game that mimics the global multi-generation planning problem for climate change and fossil fuel extraction. We implement the game under different conditions in the laboratory. Compared to a ‘libertarian’ baseline condition, we find that policy interventions that provide a costly commitment device or reduce climate threshold uncertainty reduce resource extraction. We also study two conditions to assess the underlying social preferences and the viability of ecological dictatorship. Our results suggest that climate-change policies that focus on investments that lock the economy into carbon-free energy sources provide an important commitment device in the intertemporal cooperation problem.

"Characterization and Implementation of Nash Bargaining Solutions with Non-Convexity" Free Download

CHENG-ZHONG QIN, University of California, Santa Barbara - Department of Economics
Email:
GUOFU TAN, University of Southern California - Department of Economics
Email:
ADAM CHI LEUNG WONG, Lingnan University - Department of Economics
Email:

We consider bargaining problems with compact star-shaped choice sets arising from a class of economic bargaining environments. Convex or comprehensive (relative to the disagreement point) problems are star-shaped but not conversely. We characterize single-valued solutions satisfying the Nash axioms on the class of compact star-shaped bargaining problems. For the case with two players, we show that there are exactly two solutions with each being a dictatorial (in favor of one player) selection of Nash product maximizers. We provide an extensive form game to implement Nash bargaining solutions. We extend our analysis and results to allow for alternative domains, asymmetries, and more than two players. For the n-player case, Nash solutions are shown to be determined by n-round iterative maximizations of Nash products.

"A Note on 'All-Pay Auctions with Pre- and Post-Bidding Options'" Free Download

MINBO XU, Business School, Beijing Normal University
Email:
SANXI LI, Toulouse School of Economics
Email:
JIANYE YAN, University of International Business and Economics (UIBE) - School of Banking and Finance
Email:

In a recent paper, Odegaard and Anderson (2014) consider a setting of two sales channels: a fixed list price store and an all-pay auction with a buy-price option. They did not address the concern on the coexistence of two channels. If a single firm operates dual channels, we show that the seller will be better off by shutting down the auction channel. When two firms run dual channels, we propose a Nash equilibrium of Bertrand competition in which the seller's expected net revenue is zero and the auctioneer's expected net revenue is always negative. While the seller is an incumbent, she can set a list price to enjoy positive expected net revenue and deter the auctioneer's entry.

^top

About this eJournal

This eJournal distributes working and accepted paper abstracts of empirical and theoretical papers on game theory, defined as the study of the strategic interaction among rational agents in competitive and cooperative environments, and bargaining theory, defined as a situation in which two or more players have a common interest to co-operate, but have conflicting interests over exactly how to co-operate. The topics in this eJournal include all of the subjects in Section C7 of the JEL classification system.

Editor: Victor Ricciardi, Goucher College

Submissions

To submit your research to SSRN, sign in to the SSRN User HeadQuarters, click the My Papers link on left menu and then the Start New Submission button at top of page.

Distribution Services

If your organization is interested in increasing readership for its research by starting a Research Paper Series, or sponsoring a Subject Matter eJournal, please email: RPS@SSRN.com

Distributed by

Economics Research Network (ERN), a division of Social Science Electronic Publishing (SSEP) and Social Science Research Network (SSRN)

Directors

ERN SUBJECT MATTER EJOURNALS

MICHAEL C. JENSEN
SSRN, Harvard Business School, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), Harvard University - Accounting & Control Unit
Email: mjensen@hbs.edu

Please contact us at the above addresses with your comments, questions or suggestions for ERN-Sub.