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FIDUCIARY LAW eJOURNAL
"Legislating Data Loyalty"
97 Notre Dame Law Review Reflection 356 (2022)
WOODROW HARTZOG, Boston University School of Law, Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society Email: whartzog@bu.edu NEIL M. RICHARDS, Washington University School of Law, Yale Information Society Project, Stanford Center for Internet and Society Email: nrichards@wustl.edu
Lawmakers looking to embolden privacy law have begun to consider imposing duties of loyalty on organizations trusted with people’s data and online experiences. The idea behind loyalty is simple: organizations should not process data or design technologies that conflict with the best interests of trusting parties. But the logistics and implementation of data loyalty need to be developed if the concept is going to be capable of moving privacy law beyond its “notice and consent” roots to confront people’s vulnerabilities in their relationship with powerful data collectors.
In this short Essay, we propose a model for legislating data loyalty. Our model takes advantage of loyalty’s strengths—it is well-established in our law, it is flexible, and it can accommodate conflicting values. Our Essay also explains how data loyalty can embolden our existing data privacy rules, address emergent dangers, solve privacy’s problems around consent and harm, and establish an antibetrayal ethos as America’s privacy identity.
We propose that lawmakers use a two-step process to (1) articulate a primary, general duty of loyalty, then (2) articulate “subsidiary” duties that are more specific and sensitive to context. Subsidiary duties regarding collection, personalization, gatekeeping, persuasion, and mediation would target the most opportunistic contexts for self-dealing and result in flexible open-ended duties combined with highly specific rules. In this way, a duty of data loyalty is not just appealing in theory—it can be effectively implemented in practice just like the other duties of loyalty our law has recognized for hundreds of years. Loyalty is thus not only flexible, but it is capable of breathing life into America’s historically tepid privacy frameworks.
"Charity Trustees: Governance Duties and Conflicts of Interest"
(2022) 28 (7) Trusts and Trustees
ROSEMARY TEELE LANGFORD, University of Melbourne - Law School Email: Rosemary.Langford@unimelb.edu.au MALCOLM EDWARD ANDERSON, Melbourne Law School, Australian Institute of Archaeology Email: m.anderson@unimelb.edu.au
This article reports the results of an extensive survey of charity trustees in England and Wales in relation to governance duties and conflicts of interest. The results help discern trustees’ understanding of, and confidence with, their governance duties, their enthusiasm for practical assistance with these duties, the strength of their conflicts management procedures, as well as compliance motivations and perceived barriers to enhanced governance and compliance. This in turn assists in critical evaluation of the effectiveness of the governance and regulatory system of charities in England and Wales.
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About this eJournal
This area includes content relating to fiduciary law in myriad private and public contexts. Fiduciary principles govern a remarkably broad and diverse set of relationships, offices, and institutions. They govern a wide array of professional relationships, including interactions between lawyers and clients, doctors and patients, and investment advisors and clients. They also underlie basic legal categories of relationship, including agency, trusts, and partnerships. They are the basis on which most private and public offices are held and executed. Not incidentally, they provide the core governance framework for the administration of private and pu
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