Table of Contents

The European Public Good and European Public Goods

Neil Walker, University of Edinburgh, School of Law

Influence Through Intimidation: Evidence from Business Lobbying and the Regulatory Process

Cary Coglianese, University of Pennsylvania Law School
Alex Acs, Department of Politics, Princeton University

The Differential Electoral Returns to Local Public Good Provision

Mustafa Kaba, European University Institute

Polarization, Hyperbole and the Battle for Control over the Narrative

Gordon C. Rausser, University of California, Berkeley - Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics
Leo K. Simon, University of California
Jinhua Zhao, Michigan State University

A Global Game with Strategic Substitutes and Complements: Note

Eric Hoffmann, West Texas A&M University
Tarun Sabarwal, University of Kansas

Evolutionary Stability of Preferences: Altruism, Selfishness and Envy

Sung-Hoon Park, Chosun University - Department of Economics
Jeong-Yoo Kim, Kyung-Hee University - Department of Economics


"The European Public Good and European Public Goods" Free Download
Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper No. 2020/20

NEIL WALKER, University of Edinburgh, School of Law

Historically, The EU project has focused more on the generation and satisfaction of discrete Public Goods – initially peace and prosperity but gradually extending to a wider range of material goods (e.g. environmental protection, health and safety) and social goods (e.g. non-discrimination, education) than on the endorsement and pursuit of a singular sense of the European Public Good – the idea of a shared commitment to the pursuit of a common sense of what is good for a self-recognised collective. In other words, the EU, unlike the state, has had more the characteristics of a ‘teleocracy’ (an association committed to the pursuit of specific ends) than of a ‘nomocracy’ (an association defined by commitment to a general framework of living in common). For a long time, various conceptions of European integration, and of the role of law in European integration, were predicated on the view that the pursuit of Goods would nevertheless in time lead to the generation of a holistic sense of the common Public Good. Indeed, this expectation and projection of an incrementally evolved sense of the common European Good could be seen as an important aspect of the supranational constitutional imaginary. The paper examines both the successes and the long-term limitations of such an approach, and analyses the difficulties and dangers associated with ongoing efforts to place Public Goods and the Public Good in a productive relationship at the supranational level.

"Influence Through Intimidation: Evidence from Business Lobbying and the Regulatory Process" Free Download
U of Penn Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 20-40

CARY COGLIANESE, University of Pennsylvania Law School
ALEX ACS, Department of Politics, Princeton University

Interest group influence in the policy process is often assumed to occur through a mechanism of exchange, persuasion, or subsidy. Here, we explore how business groups may also exert influence by intimidating policymakers—a form of persuasion, but one based not on the provision of policy information but of political information. We develop a theory where a business firm lobbies a regulator to communicate political information about its capacity to commit to future influence-seeking activities that would sanction the regulator. The regulator assesses the credibility of this message by evaluating the firm’s commitment to lobbying. Guided by our theory, we present evidence consistent with expectations that intimidation can shape regulatory outcomes to the advantage of certain firms, both through a chilling effect, where lobbying derails nascent regulatory plans, as well as a retreating effect, where opposition to published proposals leads to their withdrawal.

"The Differential Electoral Returns to Local Public Good Provision" Free Download

MUSTAFA KABA, European University Institute

A central question in the literature of economic voting is whether voters reward incumbents for distributive spending. Answering this question with causal evidence requires, first, to identify the voters who benefit from the spending, and second to know how they would have behaved in the absence of the spending. Using the locations of the groceries of a local food subsidy program and exploiting the variation in the geographical distances of voters to the program groceries, I first document the causal effect of this program on voting behavior. I then focus on the distinct mechanisms that drive these electoral returns by providing evidence for the vote-buying and often neglected turnout-buying channels, as well as, for how partisanship conditions the working of these channels. Finally, I discuss how the local spatial distribution of partisan groups in the geographical catchment areas of the program may influence the electoral returns within these localities.

"Polarization, Hyperbole and the Battle for Control over the Narrative" Free Download

GORDON C. RAUSSER, University of California, Berkeley - Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics
LEO K. SIMON, University of California
JINHUA ZHAO, Michigan State University

We investigate the causal connections between elite polarization, hyperbole in public discourse and narrative control. The victor of a narrative battle gains a strategic advantage in hyperbole, steering a contentious policy in its preferred direction. This gain, weighed against the information loss from hyperbole, determines the equilibrium narrative. Platform polarizations, which relate to elites’ messages, are induced by, and amplify, preference polarizations, which relate to their political orientations. IS polarizations, in which two opposing factions move further apart, intensify the narrative battle and decrease social welfare. These effects are reversed for IB polarizations, in which each faction becomes more homogeneous.

"A Global Game with Strategic Substitutes and Complements: Note" Free Download

ERIC HOFFMANN, West Texas A&M University
TARUN SABARWAL, University of Kansas

In a 2007 paper, “A global game with strategic substitutes and complements?, by Karp, L., I.H. Lee, and R. Mason, Games and Economic Behavior, 60(1), 155-175, an argument is made to show existence of Bayesian-Nash equilibrim in global games that may include both strategic substitutes and complements. This note documents a gap in the proof of that statement and presents an alternative proof for a finite player version of their model.

"Evolutionary Stability of Preferences: Altruism, Selfishness and Envy" Free Download

SUNG-HOON PARK, Chosun University - Department of Economics
JEONG-YOO KIM, Kyung-Hee University - Department of Economics

This paper examines evolutionary stability of preferences by employing deterministic replicator dynamics. The preferences of players are classified into three types: altruism, selfishness, and envy. In the stage game, players compete in pairs to maximize their subjective utilities, and, as a consequence, their material payoffs are realized. We find: (i) a monomorphic population of the altruistic (the envious) has the highest (the lowest) material payoffs; and (ii) in a game between asymmetric preference types, the payoff ordering is reversed, that is, the material payoffs of the altruistic (the envious) are the lowest (the highest). We also investigate the long-run evolution process of preference types by taking the indirect evolutionary approach, under the deterministic replicator dynamics. We first show that if players' efforts are strategic complements, envy is strictly dominated, whereas altruism is strictly dominated if efforts are strategic substitutes, implying that the strictly dominated types die out in the long run. Then, we obtain our main result that there can exist a long-run stable state in which selfish players and envious players survive together if efforts are strategic substitutes, whereas there exists no long-run stable state in which altruistic players and selfish players coexist if efforts are strategic complements.


About this eJournal

This area includes content focused on the application of formal models to problems in political science. Accordingly, papers in this section will take seriously how formal models can illuminate political processes and outcomes. Papers may be purely formal or they may include empirical analysis based on a formal model. We expect that papers using the following approaches will be distributed in the eJournal - spatial models, cooperative and noncooperative games, games of complete and incomplete information, games of learning, principal-agent models, and a variety of other formal approaches to politics and choice settings.

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