Information Acquisition By Mutual Fund Investors: Evidence from Stock Trading Suspensions

81 Pages Posted: 17 Dec 2024 Last revised: 1 Nov 2025

See all articles by Clemens Sialm

Clemens Sialm

University of Texas at Austin - McCombs School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

David X Xu

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Finance Department

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 01, 2023

Abstract

Mutual funds create liquidity for investors by issuing demandable equity shares while holding illiquid securities. We study the implications of this liquidity creation by examining frequent trading suspensions in China, which temporarily eliminate market liquidity in affected stocks. These suspensions cause significant mispricing of mutual funds due to inaccurate valuations of their illiquid holdings. We find that investors actively acquire information about suspended stocks held by mutual funds, driving flows into underpriced funds. This information is subsequently incorporated into stock prices when trading resumes. Our findings suggest that mutual fund liquidity creation stimulates information acquisition about illiquid, information-sensitive assets.

Keywords: Liquidity, Mutual Funds, Information Acquisition, Trading

Suggested Citation

Sialm, Clemens and Xu, David, Information Acquisition By Mutual Fund Investors: Evidence from Stock Trading Suspensions (November 01, 2023). SMU Cox School of Business Research Paper No. 24-18, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5047094 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5047094

Clemens Sialm

University of Texas at Austin - McCombs School of Business ( email )

Austin, TX 78712
United States

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.mccombs.utexas.edu/Clemens.Sialm/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

David Xu (Contact Author)

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Finance Department ( email )

United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
301
Abstract Views
2,045
Rank
248,651
PlumX Metrics