How Autocrats Defend Themselves Against Armed Rivals

Abstract

In this paper I investigate the survival strategies of dictators whose tenure in office depends on armed supporters. The main threat that faces such leaders is ouster by military coup. I argue that dictators’ strategy choices for responding to that threat depend on characteristics of the military force from which these rivals are likely to come. Where the military is professionalized, commanders can make credible promises to support a dictator who shares power with the rest of the officer corps and also credible threats to oust those who do not. In such circumstances, dictators’ best strategy is to agree to authoritarian institutions that induce power sharing and consultation among military rivals. Where the military is relatively unprofessionalized, however, promises of support are not credible because commanding officers cannot assure the discipline of other officers. Dictators who lack the option of stable power sharing with the rest of the military often try to build a balancing political force through the creation of a mass-based party or paramilitary force. Results of the data analysis are consistent with the argument that dictators from less professionalized armed forces are more likely to organize support parties. The argument also implies that if the strategies described are effective, dictators who form parties while they rule should be less likely to be ousted by coup than those who do not. Results from the data analysis show that party creation tends to reduce the likelihood of coups and coup attempts.

Keywords: military, authoritarian, dictatorship, autocracy