Governors as Opportunists: Evidence from Disaster Declaration Requests

Abstract

What motivates governors as they request federal aid? We argue that governors act opportunistically by leveraging their states' electoral importance when requesting presidential disaster declarations, which provide dollars to states and potential votes for presidents. We explore two aspects of gubernatorial requests. First, we hypothesize that only reelection eligible governors, especially sensitive to fiscal balance, will behave opportunistically. Second, we examine if battleground state governors' requests are influenced by the partisanship of the president. Since disaster declarations yield presidential votes, requesting from an other party president could influence presidential election outcomes. Analyzing monthly declaration requests from 1972 to 2006, we find that political variables influence governors to ask above and beyond objective measures of need, and battleground state governors do not hesitate to request from other party presidents. The electoral dynamics between governors and presidents influence the allocation of federal resources beyond actual need.