Judgment Aggregation
Introduction to Formal Philosophy S.V. Hansson and V.F. Hendricks eds Springer, 2018
18 Pages Posted: 6 Apr 2013 Last revised: 15 Jun 2019
Date Written: November 4, 2017
Abstract
Judgment aggregation theory generalizes social choice theory by having the aggregation rule bear on judgments of all kinds instead of barely judgments of preference. The paper briefly sums it up, privileging the variant that formalizes judgment by a logical syntax. The theory derives from Kornhauser and Sager’s doctrinal paradox and Pettit’s discursive dilemma, which List and Pettit turned into an impossibility theorem - the first of a long list to come. After mentioning this stage, the paper restates three theorems that are representative of the current work, by Nehring and Puppe, Dokow and Holzman, and Dietrich and Mongin, respectively, and it concludes by explaining how Dietrich and List have recovered Arrow’s theorem as a particular application of the theory.
Keywords: Judgment Aggregation Theory, Logical Aggregation Theory, Doctrinal Paradox, Discursive Dilemma, Premiss-Based vs Conclusion-Based Method, Social Choice Theory, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, Group Identification Problem
JEL Classification: D70, D71, D79
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
