Download This PaperCEO Turnover in LBOs: The Role of Boards
44 Pages Posted: 25 May 2013 Last revised: 21 Dec 2015
Date Written: December 2015
Abstract
We examine the CEO turnover in LBOs backed by private equity funds. When a company is taken private, we find that the CEO turnover decreases and is less contingent on performance. We also find that a higher involvement of the LBO sponsors, who replace the outside directors on the board after transition to private, reduces the CEO turnover and its sensitivity to performance, but improves the operating performance. These findings suggest that more inside information and effective monitoring allow private equity funds to assess CEOs' performance over a longer horizon relative to their publicly-traded counterparts.
Keywords: CEO Turnover, Private Equity, Leveraged Buyouts, Boards of Directors, Corporate Governance
JEL Classification: G34, G30, G24
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Francesca Cornelli
London Business School ( email )
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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://ecgi.global/users/o%C4%9Fuzhan-karaka%C5%9F