Bridging vs. Bonding Social Capital and the Management of Common Pool Resources

60 Pages Posted: 3 Jul 2013 Last revised: 14 Jun 2026

See all articles by Kathy Baylis

Kathy Baylis

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics

Yazhen Gong

University of British Columbia (UBC)

Shun Wang

KDI School of Public Policy and Management

Date Written: July 2013

Abstract

Social capital can facilitate community governance, but not all social capital is alike. We distinguish bonding social capital (within a village) from bridging social capital (between villages), and we compare their effects on the management of a common pool resource. We develop a theoretical model and show that bonding social capital can improve common pool resource management, while the effect of bridging social capital is mixed. We test these findings using primary data from Yunnan, China on social capital and firewood collection on communal lands. We find that bonding social capital decreases the consumption of the common pool resource, and bridging social capital erodes the effect of bonding. Bridging social capital also decreases the use of the common pool resource by villagers who are near subsistence levels of consumption. Our results are robust to alternative measures of social capital and to treating social capital as endogenous.

Suggested Citation

Baylis, Kathy and Gong, Yazhen and Wang, Shun, Bridging vs. Bonding Social Capital and the Management of Common Pool Resources (July 2013). NBER Working Paper No. w19195, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2289105

Kathy Baylis (Contact Author)

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics ( email )

1301 W. Gregory Drive
Urbana, IL 61801
United States

Yazhen Gong

University of British Columbia (UBC) ( email )

No Address Available

Shun Wang

KDI School of Public Policy and Management ( email )

P.O. Box 184
Seoul, 130-868
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

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