Observed Punishment Spillover Effects: A Laboratory Investigation of Behavior in a Social Dilemma

25 Pages Posted: 15 Sep 2013

See all articles by David L. Dickinson

David L. Dickinson

Appalachian State University

Glenn Dutcher

Ohio University; Ohio University

Cortney Stephen Rodet

Ohio University - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 13, 2013

Abstract

Punishment has been shown to be an effective reinforcement mechanism. Intentional or not, punishment will likely generate spillover effects that extend beyond one’s immediate decision environment, and these spillovers are not as well understood. We seek to understand these secondary spillover effects in a controlled lab setting using a standard social dilemma: the voluntary contributions mechanism. We find that spillovers occur when others observe punishment outside their own social dilemma. However, the specific effect of these spillovers depends on one’s personal punishment history which determines if the spillover is positive or negative.

Keywords: Punishment, Punishment Spillovers, Vicarious Punishment, VCM, Social Dilemma, Social Distance, Experiment

JEL Classification: C91, C92, D03, H40, J24, K42

Suggested Citation

Dickinson, David L. and Dutcher, Glenn and Dutcher, Glenn and Rodet, Cortney Stephen, Observed Punishment Spillover Effects: A Laboratory Investigation of Behavior in a Social Dilemma (September 13, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2325705 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2325705

David L. Dickinson

Appalachian State University ( email )

Boone, NC 28608
United States
1-828-262-2117 (Phone)
1-828-262-6105 (Fax)

Glenn Dutcher (Contact Author)

Ohio University ( email )

Bentley-Annex 3rd floor
Athens, OH 6020
United States

Ohio University ( email )

Athens, OH 45701-2979
United States
7405971261 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/glenndutcher

Cortney Stephen Rodet

Ohio University - Department of Economics ( email )

Athens, OH 45701-2979
United States

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