Deciding for Others Reduces Loss Aversion

Posted: 21 Sep 2013 Last revised: 16 Jul 2014

See all articles by Ola Andersson

Ola Andersson

Uppsala University - Department of Economics; affiliation not provided to SSRN

Håkan J. Holm

Lund University - Department of Economics

Jean-Robert Tyran

University of Vienna; University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Erik Wengström

Department of Economics, Lund University; Hanken School of Economics - Helsinki Graduate School of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 17, 2013

Abstract

We study risk taking on behalf of others, both with and without potential losses. A large-scale incentivized experiment is conducted with subjects randomly drawn from the Danish population. On average, decision makers take the same risks for other people as for themselves when losses are excluded. In contrast, when losses are possible, decisions on behalf of others are more risky. Using structural estimation, we show that this increase in risk stems from a decrease in loss aversion when others are affected by their choices.

Keywords: Risk taking, loss aversion, experiment

JEL Classification: C91, D03, D81, G02

Suggested Citation

Andersson, Ola and Andersson, Ola and Holm, Hakan J. and Tyran, Jean-Robert and Wengström, Erik, Deciding for Others Reduces Loss Aversion (September 17, 2013). IFN Working Paper No. 976, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2328642

Ola Andersson (Contact Author)

Uppsala University - Department of Economics ( email )

Box 513
Uppsala, 751 20
Sweden

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Hakan J. Holm

Lund University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7082
S-220 07 Lund
Sweden

Jean-Robert Tyran

University of Vienna ( email )

Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1
Vienna, Vienna 1090
Austria

HOME PAGE: http://homepage.univie.ac.at/jean-robert.tyran/

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics ( email )

Øster Farimagsgade 5
Bygning 26
1353 Copenhagen K.
Denmark
+45 353 23 027 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.ku.dk/tyran/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Erik Wengström

Department of Economics, Lund University ( email )

P.O. Box 7082
S-220 07 Lund
Sweden

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/erikwengstrom

Hanken School of Economics - Helsinki Graduate School of Economics ( email )

Helsinki
Finland

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
885
PlumX Metrics