To Hold Out or Not to Hold Out

28 Pages Posted: 25 Oct 2013 Last revised: 18 Jun 2026

See all articles by Frank Schorfheide

Frank Schorfheide

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); University of Pennsylvania - The Penn Institute for Economic Research (PIER)

Kenneth I. Wolpin

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2013

Abstract

A recent literature has developed that combines two prominent empirical approaches to ex ante policy evaluation: randomized controlled trials (RCT) and structural estimation. The RCT provides a "gold-standard'' estimate of a particular treatment, but only of that treatment. Structural estimation provides the capability to extrapolate beyond the experimental treatment, but is based on untestable assumptions and is subject to structural data mining. Combining the approaches by holding out from the structural estimation exercise either the treatment or control sample allows for external validation of the underlying behavioral model. Although intuitively appealing, this holdout methodology is not well grounded. For instance, it is easy to show that it is suboptimal from a Bayesian perspective. Using a stylized representation of a randomized controlled trial, we provide a formal rationale for the use of a holdout sample in an environment in which data mining poses an impediment to the implementation of the ideal Bayesian analysis and a numerical illustration of the potential benefits of holdout samples.

Suggested Citation

Schorfheide, Frank and Wolpin, Kenneth I., To Hold Out or Not to Hold Out (October 2013). NBER Working Paper No. w19565, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2345060

Frank Schorfheide (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/~schorf

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Cambridge, MA 02138
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University of Pennsylvania - The Penn Institute for Economic Research (PIER) ( email )

Philadelphia, PA
United States

Kenneth I. Wolpin

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-7708 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

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