The Nature and Incidence of Software Piracy: Evidence from Windows

50 Pages Posted: 20 Dec 2013 Last revised: 25 Jun 2026

See all articles by Susan Carleton Athey

Susan Carleton Athey

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Scott Stern

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: December 2013

Abstract

This paper evaluates the nature, relative incidence and drivers of software piracy. In contrast to prior studies, we analyze data that allows us to measure piracy for a specific product - Windows 7 - which was associated with a significant level of private sector investment. Using anonymized telemetry data, we are able to characterize the ways in which piracy occurs, the relative incidence of piracy across different economic and institutional environments, and the impact of enforcement efforts on choices to install pirated versus paid software. We find that: (a) the vast majority of "retail piracy" can be attributed to a small number of widely distributed "hacks" that are available through the Internet, (b) the incidence of piracy varies significantly with the microeconomic and institutional environment, and (c) software piracy primarily focuses on the most "advanced" version of Windows (Windows Ultimate). After controlling for a small number of measures of institutional quality and broadband infrastructure, one important candidate driver of piracy - GDP per capita - has no significant impact on the observed piracy rate, while the innovation orientation of an economy is associated with a lower rate of piracy. Finally, we are able to evaluate how piracy changes in response to country-specific anti-piracy enforcement efforts against specific peer-to-peer websites; overall, we find no systematic evidence that such enforcement efforts have had an impact on the incidence of software piracy.

Suggested Citation

Carleton Athey, Susan and Stern, Scott, The Nature and Incidence of Software Piracy: Evidence from Windows (December 2013). NBER Working Paper No. w19755, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2370211

Susan Carleton Athey (Contact Author)

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

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Scott Stern

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-3053 (Phone)
617-253-2660 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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