Confirmation Bias as a Default Heuristic in Novice Chess Players' Problem Solving

Abstract

Confirmation bias, the compiling of cases verifying one’s beliefs, as opposed to cases to falsify one’s beliefs (falsification), has been linked to inefficient and systematic error in human thinking. Previous research has suggested that when task-specific information is lacking or cognitive demands are high, reasoners will rely on a confirmation strategy as a heuristic when engaging in hypothesis testing. To investigate this hypothesis a combined think aloud-retrospective method was adopted to examine levels of confirmation at novice and expert levels of chess expertise. Ten chess novices and ten experts were instructed to think aloud while choosing a move in given chess positions. Verbalised move sequences were recorded and called back to the chess player to elicit whether they led to a positive (confirming) outcome or negative (falsifying) outcome. It was predicted that novices who do not typically possess substantial amounts of chess specific knowledge would rely on a confirming strategy as a heuristic to select a move in a game of chess. Chess experts have been found to possess large repositories of chess specific knowledge in long-term memory. Access to such knowledge was predicted to reduce cognitive load when choosing a chess move so that experts confirm to a lesser extent and falsify to a greater extent than novices when selecting chess moves. Significant evidence was found to support the use of a confirmation strategy by novices when choosing a move. Experts where found to falsify to a greater extent than confirm when compared to novices as predicted.

Keywords: Confirmation Bias, Heuristics, Problem Solving