Bounded Rationality and Strategic Complementarity in a Macroeconomic Model: Policy Effects, Persistence and Multipliers

29 Pages Posted: 21 May 1998 Last revised: 26 Jun 2022

See all articles by Antulio N. Bomfim

Antulio N. Bomfim

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Francis X. Diebold

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: March 1996

Abstract

Motivated by recent developments in the bounded rationality and strategic complementarity literatures, we examine an intentionally simple and stylized aggregative economic model, when the assumptions of fully rational expectations and no strategic interactions are relaxed. We show that small deviations from rational expectations, taken alone, lead only to small deviations from classical policy- ineffectiveness, but that the situation can change dramatically when strategic complementarity is introduced. Strategic complementarity magnifies the effects of even small departures from rational expectations, producing equilibria with policy effectiveness, output persistence and multiplier effects.

Suggested Citation

Bomfim, Antulio N. and Diebold, Francis X., Bounded Rationality and Strategic Complementarity in a Macroeconomic Model: Policy Effects, Persistence and Multipliers (March 1996). NBER Working Paper No. w5482, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3121

Antulio N. Bomfim

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

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Francis X. Diebold (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

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