Managerial Trustworthiness and Buybacks

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Forthcoming

European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper 703/2020

56 Pages Posted: 27 Nov 2018 Last revised: 6 Feb 2022

See all articles by Sterling Huang

Sterling Huang

New York University (NYU) - New York University (NYU), Shanghai

Kaisa Snellman

INSEAD - Organisational Behavior

Theo Vermaelen

INSEAD - Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: November 1, 2020

Abstract

CEO trustworthiness is positively related to long-term excess returns after buyback announcements. When the CEO is trustworthy, statements that the stock is undervalued are more credible. CEO trustworthiness is initially measured by the extent to which people in the county where the company headquarters is located trust each other. Further, the positive impact of trustworthiness on excess returns is higher when the CEO has been a long-term resident of a high-trust county, and correspondingly, trustworthy CEOs are less likely to be accused of financial misreporting. Our conclusions are confirmed when we use alternative measures of trustworthiness such as employee trust and CEO integrity.

Keywords: Buybacks, Market Timing, CEO Trustworthiness, Buyback Motivations

JEL Classification: G32, G30

Suggested Citation

Huang, Sterling and Snellman, Kaisa and Vermaelen, Theo, Managerial Trustworthiness and Buybacks (November 1, 2020). Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Forthcoming, European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper 703/2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3277418 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3277418

Sterling Huang (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - New York University (NYU), Shanghai ( email )

1555 Century Ave
Shanghai, Shanghai 200122
China

Kaisa Snellman

INSEAD - Organisational Behavior ( email )

Boulevard de Constance
Fontainebleau 77305
France

Theo Vermaelen

INSEAD - Finance ( email )

Boulevard de Constance
F-77305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France
33 1 60 72 42 63 (Phone)
33 1 60 72 40 45 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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