Framework for the Experimental Research on Cartel Deterrence Through Leniency and Whistleblowing Programmes

Abstract

Die deutsche Version des Papers ist abrufbar unter: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3337826

So far, leniency programmes have been widely used to combat cartels. A company participating in the cartel gets a reduction of its fine for the initial notification of the Antitrust Authorities (AA). The emerging trust problem and the increased attractiveness for a specific company to deviate from the cartel agreements are intended to effectively deter cartels.

The introduction of an incentive-based whistleblowing programme for individuals could be another important contribution to the effective deterrence of cartels. The experimental design which is presented here serves to analyse such a whistleblowing programme and its interaction with a corporate leniency programme. The variation of the design regarding reductions in penalties and the interaction of the two measures makes it possible to examine in which cases deterrence of cartels can be achieved. Ultimately, these are fundamental findings which can serve as a basis for a criminal policy decision.

Keywords: Whistleblowing, Leniency, prinicpal witness, key witness, incentive-based, cartel, experimental research, anti-trust, antitrust

JEL Classification: K21, K20, A12, K42