Media Freedom in the Shadow of a Coup

Popular protests and palace coups are the two domestic threats to dictators. We show that free media, which informs citizens about their rulers, is a double-edged sword that alleviates one threat, but exacerbates the other. Informed citizens may protest against a ruler, but they may also protest to restore him after a palace coup. In choosing media freedom, the leader trades off these conflicting effects. We develop a model in which citizens engage in a regime change global game, and media freedom is a ruler’s instrument for Bayesian persuasion, used to manage the competing risks of coups and protests. A coup switches the status quo from being in the ruler’s favor to being against him. This introduces convexities in the ruler’s Bayesian persuasion problem, causing him to benefit from an informed citizenry. Rulers tolerate freer press when citizens are pessimistic about them, or coups signal information about them to citizens.

Keywords: authoritarian politics, media freedom, protest, coup, global games, Bayesian persuasion, signaling

JEL Classification: H00, D82

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Boleslavsky, Raphael and Shadmehr, Mehdi and Sonin, Konstantin, Media Freedom in the Shadow of a Coup (January 25, 2019). University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper No. 2019-81, University of Miami Business School Research Paper No. 3396728, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396728 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3396728