Pandemic Paradox and Polanyi: Financial Markets Rise, Economies Crash, and Regulators Toss a Coin

15 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2020 Last revised: 17 Nov 2020

See all articles by Mark Findlay

Mark Findlay

University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh Law School; The British Institute of International and Comparative Law (BIICL) - Competition Law Forum

Date Written: August 11, 2020

Abstract

In the pandemic, investors like all responsible citizens share an obligation to keep the community safe. This obligation extends to informed market decision-making which goes beyond self-interest. The current disconnect between financial markets and the economy is a story of two different realities – or perhaps one harsh reality and one expectant gamble. The disconnect cannot just be explained by the different purposes of economic and financial market analysis but rather by the information indicators on which these rely. To forewarn regulators concerned that these two worlds of global wealth generation and growth moving to polar opposite futures, this brief review has these aims:

• To reflect on a legal model for financial markets, their regulation and its limitations so that law and finance may be understood as positively relational when considering market sustainability; and then
• To suggest that the explanation for this dangerous disconnect can be found in Karl Polanyi’s understanding of fictitious commodities in self-regulating markets, dis-embedding from the social and his propositions for market correction through the double movement.

Despite the neoliberal logic to the contrary (where financial markets are deemed only for maximising investor/shareholder profit) financial market regulation should prioritise market sustainability as part of pandemic control policy.

Keywords: Financial markets; economy; disconnect; pandemic crisis; market sustainability and resilience; responsible market decision-making

Suggested Citation

Findlay, Mark James, Pandemic Paradox and Polanyi: Financial Markets Rise, Economies Crash, and Regulators Toss a Coin (August 11, 2020). SMU Centre for AI & Data Governance Research Paper No. 2020/09, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3671327 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3671327

Mark James Findlay (Contact Author)

University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh Law School ( email )

Edinburgh
Great Britain

The British Institute of International and Comparative Law (BIICL) - Competition Law Forum ( email )

United Kingdom

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