Evading the Torpedo: Why Managers Avoid Stock Splits

45 Pages Posted: 26 May 2021 Last revised: 8 Feb 2025

See all articles by John C. Heater

John C. Heater

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Accounting

Ye Liu

Fudan University

Qin Tan

City University of Hong Kong (CityU)

Frank Zhang

Yale School of Management

Date Written: October 31, 2023

Abstract

This paper documents a previously unrecognized yet significant cost of stock splits, reflected in lower earnings announcement returns (EAR) in the post-split period. We identify two primary channels underlying this phenomenon: lower earnings surprises (FE) and lower earnings response coefficients (ERC). First, firms that undergo stock splits tend to report lower earnings surprises post-split. Second, the quality of these earnings surprises declines as firms increasingly engage in earnings management to meet or beat earnings targets, resulting in a weaker market response. Collectively, our findings suggest a substantial and long-lasting cost to stock-splitting firms, as managers are unlikely to favor outcomes such as lower EAR, diminished FE, weakened ERC, and a heightened reliance on earnings management on an ongoing quarterly basis. Furthermore, the cost of stock splits has significantly increased over time, which partially explains the observed decline in their frequency.

Keywords: Stock Splits, Earnings, Returns

JEL Classification: G30, G32, M21, M4

Suggested Citation

Heater, John C. and Liu, Ye and Tan, Qin and Zhang, Frank, Evading the Torpedo: Why Managers Avoid Stock Splits (October 31, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3853047 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3853047

John C. Heater (Contact Author)

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Accounting ( email )

271 19th Avenue South
Room 645 Mgt. Econ. Building
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

HOME PAGE: http://johnheater.com

Ye Liu

Fudan University ( email )

670 Guoshun Rd
Shanghai, Shanghai 200433
China

Qin Tan

City University of Hong Kong (CityU) ( email )

83 Tat Chee Avenue
Kowloon, 九龍
Hong Kong

Frank Zhang

Yale School of Management ( email )

135 Prospect Street
P.O. Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States

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