Is Ambiguity Aversion a Preference? Ambiguity Aversion Without Asymmetric Information

47 Pages Posted: 6 Dec 2022

See all articles by Daniel L. Chen

Daniel L. Chen

Directeur de Recherche, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Toulouse School of Economics, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, University of Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse, France

Martin Schonger

ETH Zürich

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Abstract

Ambiguity aversion is the interpretation of the experimental finding (the Ellsberg paradox) that most subjects prefer betting on events whose probabilities are known (objective) to betting on events whose probabilities are unknown (subjective). However in typical experiments these unknown probabilities are known by others. Thus the typical Ellsberg experiment is a situation of asymmetric information. People may try to avoid situations where they are the less informed party, which is normatively appropriate. We find that eliminating asymmetric information in the Ellsberg experiment while leaving ambiguity in place, makes subjects prefer the ambiguous bet over the objective one, reversing the prior results.

Keywords: Uncertainty Aversion, Probabilistic sophistication, Sources of ambiguity, Ellsberg paradox

Suggested Citation

Chen, Daniel L. and Schonger, Martin, Is Ambiguity Aversion a Preference? Ambiguity Aversion Without Asymmetric Information. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4294997 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4294997

Daniel L. Chen (Contact Author)

Directeur de Recherche, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Toulouse School of Economics, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, University of Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse, France ( email )

Toulouse School of Economics
1, Esplanade de l'Université
Toulouse, 31080
France

Martin Schonger

ETH Zürich ( email )

Rämistrasse 101
ZUE F7
Zürich, 8092
Switzerland

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