Regulating Robo-advisors in an Age of Generative Artificial Intelligence

76 Pages Posted: 24 Jan 2025 Last revised: 17 Jun 2025

See all articles by Daniel Schwarcz

Daniel Schwarcz

University of Minnesota Law School

Tom Baker

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Kyle D. Logue

University of Michigan Law School

Date Written: December 01, 2024

Abstract

New generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools can increasingly engage in personalized, sustained and natural conversations with users. This technology has the capacity to reshape the financial services industry, making customized expert financial advice broadly available to consumers. However, AI’s ability to convincingly mimic human financial advisors also creates significant risks of large-scale financial misconduct. Which of these possibilities becomes reality will depend largely on the legal and regulatory rules governing “robo-advisors” that supply fully automated financial advice to consumers. This Article consequently critically examines this evolving regulatory landscape, arguing that current U.S. rules fail to adequately limit the risk that robo-advisors powered by generative AI will convince large numbers of consumers to purchase costly and inappropriate financial products and services. Drawing on general principles of consumer financial regulation and the EU’s recently enacted AI Act, the Article proposes addressing this deficiency through a dual regulatory approach: a licensing requirement for robo-advisors that use generative AI to help match consumers with financial products or services, and heightened ex post duties of care and loyalty for all robo-advisors. This framework seeks to appropriately balance the transformative potential of generative AI to deliver accessible financial advice with the risk that this emerging technology may significantly amplify the provision of conflicted or inaccurate advice.

Suggested Citation

Schwarcz, Daniel and Baker, Tom and Logue, Kyle D., Regulating Robo-advisors in an Age of Generative Artificial Intelligence (December 01, 2024). 82 Washington and Lee Law Review 775 (2025), Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 25-09, U of Michigan Law & Econ Research Paper No. 24-042, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5040343 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5040343

Daniel Schwarcz (Contact Author)

University of Minnesota Law School ( email )

229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.umn.edu/profiles/daniel-schwarcz

Tom Baker

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School ( email )

3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-746-2185 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/thbaker/

Kyle D. Logue

University of Michigan Law School ( email )

625 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215
United States
734.936.2207 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://kylelogue.net

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