Mergers and Non-contractible Benefits: The Employees' Perspective

55 Pages Posted: 4 Jun 2025 Last revised: 23 Feb 2026

See all articles by Wei Cai

Wei Cai

Columbia Business School

Andrea Prat

Columbia University in the City of New York; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Jiehang Yu

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 29, 2025

Abstract

Incomplete contract theory, supported by anecdotal evidence, suggests that when a firm is acquired, workers may be adversely affected in non-contractible aspects of their work experience. This paper empirically investigates this prediction by combining M&A events from the Refinitiv database and web-scraped Glassdoor review data. We find that: (a) Controlling for pre-trends, mergers lead to lower satisfaction, especially on non-contractible dimensions of the employee experience (about 6% of a standard deviation); (b) The effect is stronger in the target firm than in the acquiring firm; (c) Text analysis of employee comments indicates that the decline in satisfaction is primarily associated with perceived breaches of implicit contracts. Our findings indicate that mergers may reduce workers' job utility through non-monetary channels.

Keywords: mergers, employee experience

Suggested Citation

Cai, Wei and Prat, Andrea and Yu, Jiehang, Mergers and Non-contractible Benefits: The Employees' Perspective (May 29, 2025). Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 5281052, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5281052 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5281052

Wei Cai

Columbia Business School ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Andrea Prat (Contact Author)

Columbia University in the City of New York ( email )

New York
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Jiehang Yu

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance ( email )

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
315
Abstract Views
1,206
Rank
240,877
PlumX Metrics