Smart Contracting in Network Markets

61 Pages Posted: 4 Nov 2025 Last revised: 21 Jun 2026

See all articles by Darrell Duffie

Darrell Duffie

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Canadian Derivatives Institute

Chaojun Wang

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School

Date Written: November 02, 2025

Abstract

With complete-information bilateral bargaining in network settings, holdup is eliminated when contracts across the network are agreed atomically (all or none) via a smart contract. Applications include over-the-counter asset trading, third-party-financed purchase agreements, and land assembly. Under a novel extensive-form bargaining protocol, a firm can give a "greenlight" to the terms of a contract proposed to that firm, and the protocol automatically converts those terms into a binding contract if the terms proposed to all other firms are likewise given greenlights. In any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with Markov strategies, firms immediately agree on socially efficient contracts.

Keywords: network, bargaining, smart contract, atomic settlement, holdup, over-the-counter

JEL Classification: D47, D60, D70, G12, K22, C70, L14

Suggested Citation

Duffie, James Darrell and Wang, Chaojun, Smart Contracting in Network Markets (November 02, 2025). Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper Forthcoming, The Wharton School Research Paper , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5695523 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5695523

James Darrell Duffie

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Knight Management Center
Stanford, CA 94305-7298
United States
650-723-1976 (Phone)
650-725-8916 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Canadian Derivatives Institute ( email )

3000, chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine
Montréal, Québec H3T 2A7
Canada

Chaojun Wang (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

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