Shadow Discounts

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See all articles by Tomy Lee

Tomy Lee

Central European University (CEU) - Department of Economics

Isacco Lotti

Bocconi University - IGIER - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research

Florian Nagler

Bocconi University; Baffi (Centre on Economics, Finance and Regulation); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IGIER - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research

Giorgio Ottonello

WU Vienna University of Economics and Business

Chaojun Wang

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School

Date Written: July 04, 2026

Abstract

Centralized trading platforms should improve competition in OTC markets. Using transaction records from the U.S. corporate bond market and exploiting variation within client-dealer relationships, we find no evidence that clients receive better secondary-market trading terms after adopting a platform. To reconcile this puzzling finding, we present a model in which relationship dealers operate in both primary and secondary markets. A central insight, for which we find strong empirical support, is that dealers respond to clients' improved outside options not by changing secondary-market terms, but by granting larger primary-market allocations. Guided by the model, we estimate that platform adoption is worth 77% of clients' pre-adoption profits from primary-market allocations. Overall, the effects of platforms in OTC markets are more complex than previously thought.

Keywords: OTC market, relationships, primary market, secondary market, platform adoption

JEL Classification: G10, G12, G22

Suggested Citation

Lee, Tomy and Lotti, Isacco and Nagler, Florian and Ottonello, Giorgio and Wang, Chaojun, Shadow Discounts (July 04, 2026). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=

Tomy Lee

Central European University (CEU) - Department of Economics ( email )

Quellenstrasse 51
Vienna, Vienna 1100
Austria

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/tomylee/home

Isacco Lotti

Bocconi University - IGIER - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy

Florian Nagler (Contact Author)

Bocconi University ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, MI 20136
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/floriannagler/

Baffi (Centre on Economics, Finance and Regulation) ( email )

Via Röntgen 1
Milan, MI 20136
Italy

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

IGIER - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research ( email )

Milan, MI 20136
Italy

Giorgio Ottonello

WU Vienna University of Economics and Business ( email )

Welthandelsplatz 1, Building D1, 3rd Floor
Vienna, 1020
Austria

Chaojun Wang

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

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