The Two Faces of Independence: Betweenness and Homotheticity

University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Working Paper No. 179

61 Pages Posted: 14 Nov 2014

See all articles by Daniel Burghart

Daniel Burghart

University of Zurich - Department of Economics

Thomas Epper

CNRS - Lille Economics & Managment - UMR 9221

Ernst Fehr

University of Zurich - Department of Economics

Date Written: November 2014

Abstract

Many studies document failures of expected utility’s key assumption, the independence axiom. Here, we show that independence can be decomposed into two distinct axioms – betweenness and homotheticity – and that these two axioms are necessary and sufficient for independence. Thus, independence can fail because homotheticity, betweenness, or both are violated. Most research has focused on models that assume subjects will violate both axioms or models that assume subjects will satisfy betweenness but violate homotheticity. Our decomposition of independence into betweenness and homotheticity allows us to show, however, that a significant share of subjects obey homotheticity but violate betweenness. Using data from a revealed preference experiment, and without making any parametric assumptions, we show that 1/3 of participants belong in the neglected class of preferences that violate independence but satisfy homotheticity, indicating that betweenness is violated. Another 1/3 of participants satisfy independence. The remaining 1/3 fail both independence and homotheticity and may also fail betweenness. Our results provide useful constraints on future modeling attempts by highlighting, in a non-parametric way, an empirically relevant class of preferences.

Keywords: Revealed preferences, risk preferences, expected utility, independence axiom, betweenness, homotheticity, consumer choice, aggregation

JEL Classification: C91, D11, D12, D83

Suggested Citation

Burghart, Daniel and Epper, Thomas and Fehr, Ernst, The Two Faces of Independence: Betweenness and Homotheticity (November 2014). University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Working Paper No. 179, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2523486 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2523486

Daniel Burghart (Contact Author)

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

Zürich
Switzerland

Thomas Epper

CNRS - Lille Economics & Managment - UMR 9221 ( email )

Lille
France

Ernst Fehr

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

Blümlisalpstrasse 10
Zuerich, 8006
Switzerland
+41 1 634 3709 (Phone)
+41 1 634 4907 (Fax)

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