M&A Rumors: Why Sellers Hate Them

39 Pages Posted: 5 Jun 2017

See all articles by Yan Alperovych

Yan Alperovych

emlyon business school

Douglas J. Cumming

Stevens Institute of Technology - School of Business

Alexander Peter Groh

Aix-Marseille University; Institut d'Administration des Entreprises d'Aix-en-Provence (IAE Aix); CERGAM

Date Written: June 5, 2017

Abstract

We provide large sample evidence on the causes and consequences of takeover rumors. In fact, 55.2% of non-completed M&A deals involve rumors, while only 17.3% of completed deals involve them. Probit regression models reveal that rumors are deal-breakers and reduce the likelihood of deal completion by 37-41%. Simultaneous equations confirm this result, even if rumors are not exogenous events but instead spread on purpose; e.g., in an attempt to prevent an M&A transaction or if caused by unobservable effects. If a rumored transaction still emerges, the rumor has destroyed $7.8 million worth of the value of the median M&A deal.

Keywords: Takeovers, Private Equity, Rumors, Deal Completion

JEL Classification: G12, G14, G18, K22

Suggested Citation

Alperovych, Yan and Cumming, Douglas J. and Groh, Alexander Peter, M&A Rumors: Why Sellers Hate Them (June 5, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2980725

Yan Alperovych (Contact Author)

emlyon business school ( email )

144 av. Jean Jaurès
Lyon, 69007
France

Douglas J. Cumming

Stevens Institute of Technology - School of Business ( email )

Hoboken, NJ 07030
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/douglascumming/

Alexander Peter Groh

Aix-Marseille University ( email )

3 Avenue Robert Schuman
3 Avenue Robert Schuman,
Aix-en-Provence, 13628
France

Institut d'Administration des Entreprises d'Aix-en-Provence (IAE Aix) ( email )

Clos Guiot Puyricard - CS 30063
Aix en Provence, Bouch du Rhone 13089
France

CERGAM ( email )

France

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