Enforcement Malfeasance, Witness Participation, Crime, and Reform

Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3516850

Download This Paper

Open PDF in Browser

Add Paper to My Library

Enforcement Malfeasance, Witness Participation, Crime, and Reform

53 Pages Posted: 30 Jan 2020 Last revised: 2 Apr 2020

See all articles by Andrew F. Daughety

Andrew F. Daughety

Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University

Jennifer F. Reinganum

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics

Date Written: March 31, 2020

Abstract

We develop a model wherein a reputation for prosecutorial malfeasance reduces the willingness of witnesses to cooperate with prosecutors. This causes an increase in the crime rate and in wrongly-convicted innocent defendants. Because citizens are taxpayers and may be victims, perpetrators, witnesses, or falsely-accused defendants, they care about the prosecutor’s quality. They update beliefs about this quality based on the disposition of cases. If the prosecutor’s believed quality falls below a threshold, then a majority of voters choose to replace the prosecutor with a challenger, in expectation of reform. We compare the majority’s choice with that of a social planner.

Keywords: Crime, Enforcement, Prosecutors, Witness

JEL Classification: D82, K42

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Daughety, Andrew F. and Reinganum, Jennifer F., Enforcement Malfeasance, Witness Participation, Crime, and Reform (March 31, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3516850 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3516850