Download This PaperAntitrust Analysis of Platform Markets: Why the Supreme Court Got it Right in American Express
Antitrust Analysis of Platform Markets: Why the Supreme Court Got it Right in American Express, Competition Policy International, 2019 ISBN: 978-1950769414
196 Pages Posted: 8 Apr 2020
Date Written: December 4, 2019
Abstract
Platform businesses that facilitate connections between different stakeholders play an increasingly prominent role in the economy. In 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a seminal decision, Ohio et. al. v. American Express, on the analysis of antitrust issues involving these sorts of businesses. This book explains the economic basis for the Court’s analysis. The Court found that antitrust analysis of two-sided platforms that enable transactions between distinct groups, such as cardholders and merchants, must account for both groups in market definition and the analysis of anticompetitive effects The authors describe the problems with alternative approaches that were presented to the Court and consider the key criticisms levied against the Court’s analysis. Given the growing importance platforms in the economy, particularly digital ones, antitrust will deal with more cases governed by the American Express decision in the US, as well as judgments by other courts on similar issues around the world.
Keywords: antitrust of multisided platforms, two-sided markets, transaction platforms, American Express decision, market definition for two-sided platforms, indirect network effects
JEL Classification: K21, K4, L1. L4, L5, L2
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Richard Schmalensee
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
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