Common Subcontracting and Airline Prices

36 Pages Posted: 8 May 2020 Last revised: 26 Dec 2023

See all articles by Gaurab Aryal

Gaurab Aryal

Boston University - Department of Economics

Dennis J. Campbell

University of Virginia - Department of Economics

Federico Ciliberto

University of Virginia - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); DIW Econ GmbH

Ekaterina Khmelnitskaya

University of British Columbia, Sauder School of Business

Date Written: April 14, 2020

Abstract

In the US airline industry, independent regional airlines fly passengers on behalf of several national airlines across different markets, giving rise to common subcontracting. On the one hand, we find that subcontracting is associated with lower prices, consistent with the notion that regional airlines tend to fly passengers at lower costs than major airlines. On the other hand, we find that common subcontracting is associated with higher prices. These two countervailing effects suggest that the growth of regional airlines can have anticompetitive implications for the industry.

Keywords: Airlines, Common Subcontracting, Anticompetitive Pricing

JEL Classification: D22, L12, L93

Suggested Citation

Aryal, Gaurab and Campbell, Dennis J. and Ciliberto, Federico and Khmelnitskaya, Ekaterina, Common Subcontracting and Airline Prices (April 14, 2020). Review of Economics and Statistics, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3576044 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3576044

Gaurab Aryal (Contact Author)

Boston University - Department of Economics ( email )

270 Bay State Road
Boston, MA 02215
United States

Dennis J. Campbell

University of Virginia - Department of Economics ( email )

237 Monroe Hall
P.O. Box 400182
Charlottesville, VA 22904-418
United States

Federico Ciliberto

University of Virginia - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 400182
Charlottesville, VA 22904-4182
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

DIW Econ GmbH ( email )

Mohrenstraße 58
Berlin, 10117
Germany

Ekaterina Khmelnitskaya

University of British Columbia, Sauder School of Business ( email )

2053 Main Mall
Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2
Canada

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