Guarantor Financing in a Four-Party Supply Chain Game with Leadership Influence

Weihua Zhou, Tiantian Li, and Gangshu Cai. 2020. Guarantor Financing in a Four-party Supply Chain with Leadership Influence. Production and Operations Management. Forthcoming.

39 Pages Posted: 23 Aug 2017 Last revised: 15 Apr 2020

See all articles by Weihua Zhou

Weihua Zhou

Zhejiang University

Tiantian Lin

Zhejiang University

Gangshu (George) Cai

Santa Clara University

Date Written: August 18, 2017

Abstract

This study investigates manufacturer guarantor financing (MG) and third-party logistics (3PL) guarantor financing (LG) in a four-party supply chain game that features a manufacturer, a 3PL, a capital-constrained retailer, and a bank. The manufacturer or 3PL can act as the guarantor for the retailer who borrows bank credit. Two different leadership structures are investigated, namely, Nash game and manufacturer leadership Stackelberg game, where the manufacturer and 3PL decide simultaneously and sequentially, respectively. The supply chain under both leadership structures prefers guarantor financing to traditional bank financing when the supply chain is sufficiently cost-efficient. In the Nash game, however, firms encounter a free-rider dilemma when choosing between MG and LG, wherein both potential guarantors prefer the other to be the guarantor. This free-rider dilemma can be resolved in the Stackelberg game. We also observe the follower–guarantor advantage in the Stackelberg game, wherein all firms favor the follower to provide guarantor financing. Our analysis shows that the supply chain under guarantor financing with a longer decision hierarchy (i.e., the Stackelberg game) can be conditionally more effective than that with a shorter one (i.e., the Nash game). By further analyzing different cost structures, pricing mechanism, and retailer’s initial capital, we find that most of our qualitative results remain accurate under more sophisticated conditions. These findings enhance our understanding of the value of guarantor financing in a capital-constrained supply chain and the impact of leadership structure on financing decisions.

Keywords: manufacturer guarantor financing; 3PL guarantor financing; bank financing; newsvendor theory; Stackelberg leadership; Nash game

Suggested Citation

Zhou, Weihua and Lin, Tiantian and Cai, Gangshu (George), Guarantor Financing in a Four-Party Supply Chain Game with Leadership Influence (August 18, 2017). Weihua Zhou, Tiantian Li, and Gangshu Cai. 2020. Guarantor Financing in a Four-party Supply Chain with Leadership Influence. Production and Operations Management. Forthcoming. , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3021510 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3021510

Weihua Zhou

Zhejiang University ( email )

38 Zheda Road
Hangzhou, Zhejiang 310058
China

Tiantian Lin

Zhejiang University ( email )

38 Zheda Road
Hangzhou, Zhejiang 310058
China

Gangshu (George) Cai (Contact Author)

Santa Clara University ( email )

500 El Camino Real
Santa Clara, CA CA 95053
United States
4085542785 (Phone)

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