Do Creditors Have a Say on Dividends: Evidence from a Quasi Experiment

53 Pages Posted: 22 Apr 2020 Last revised: 2 Jun 2021

See all articles by Najah Attig

Najah Attig

Dalhousie University; Dalhousie University

Paul Brockman

Lehigh University - College of Business

Mohammad M. Rahaman

Saint Mary's University - Sobey School of Business

Date Written: April 17, 2020

Abstract

We investigate the impact of strengthening creditors’ right on firms’ dividend policies. Using the exogenous changes in creditor rights resulting from the staggered enactment of anti-recharacterization laws (ARL), we find that strengthening creditor rights can lead to an economically significant increase in dividend payment for shareholders, amounting to about 33 percent increase compared to the average sampled firm. The elevated impact of strengthening creditrs’ right on dividend payment is more pronounced for financially constrained, poorly governed, informationally opaque, and agency-prone firms. Using granular loan-contract information, we demonstrate that strengthening creditors’ right leads to elevated access to credit market and through this channel of enhanced debt capacity firms can redirect more funds for shareholders’ payout. Our results give credence to the stakeholder theory of firms, suggesting that improving the rights of one stakeholder can entail positive spillover effects on other stakeholders of firms.

Suggested Citation

Attig, Najah and Brockman, Paul and Rahaman, Mohammad M., Do Creditors Have a Say on Dividends: Evidence from a Quasi Experiment (April 17, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3578661 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3578661

Najah Attig (Contact Author)

Dalhousie University ( email )

Rowe School of Business
6100 University Avenue
Halifax, Nova Scotia B3H 4R2
Canada
902-494-7486 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://scholar.google.ca/citations?user=J53887sAAAAJ&hl=en

Dalhousie University ( email )

Paul Brockman

Lehigh University - College of Business ( email )

Bethlehem, PA 18015
United States

Mohammad M. Rahaman

Saint Mary's University - Sobey School of Business ( email )

Halifax, Nova Scotia B3H 3C3
Canada

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