Download This Paper21st-Century Warfare: Disinformation & Its Implications with the State Action Doctrine
Journal for Race, Gender, & Poverty, November 2019
24 Pages Posted: 13 May 2020
Date Written: 2019
Abstract
Consider the following hypothetical in which a political action committee began to offer support for their preferred candidate. As part of the PAC’s marketing efforts, the group purchases thousands of Facebook and Instagram political ads. The PAC's platform encouraged the suppression of votes of minority citizens. PAC members therefore created a fire-hose of falsehoods online by publishing misleading or false information about voter registration and even election day. Also, members created organic Twitter posts that contain damaging stories accusing the incumbent president of bribery. Now compare the above-mentioned hypothetical to Russia’s active measures operation against the United States before the 2016 presidential election. Active measures refer to actions of political warfare conducted by the Russian security services to influence public affairs by conducting covert operations, which range "from media manipulations to special actions involving various degrees of violence" Although it is not likely that people will come into your neighborhood and explicitly give you the wrong information, the opportunity to mislead individuals still exists on the internet, especially social media platforms. Ahead of the 2016 presidential election, Russia exploited existing divisions, such as racism and sexism, by intentionally spreading misleading and false information related to those subjects on social media platforms. Russian operatives sought to build on legitimate grievances within online communities by publishing content intended to cause protest. The published content tends to mobilize only a handful of engaged participants. Equally, people who remain silent may be affected, whereas some followers may become apathetic. As a result, members of a community may eventually lose faith in the law of our country and the court system. Part I of this note will discuss disinformation generally and how disinformation attacks the physiological vulnerabilities in humans. Part II of this article will discuss historical examples of foreign disinformation campaigns directed at the United States, which include the 2016 presidential election. This section will also examine Russia’s underlying goal of using social media as a tool to sow discord in foreign countries, whereas minority populations are prime targets of disinformation. Part III will discuss the implications that occur when Congress attempts to regulate social media platforms and the companies' ability to moderate the content. Also, Part III will include a recommendation to pursue a human rights approach in response to the threat of disinformation.
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