Political Affiliation and Media Distrust: Evidence from Stock Market Investors

49 Pages Posted: 6 Dec 2016 Last revised: 23 Jan 2026

See all articles by Mancy Luo

Mancy Luo

Bayes Business School (formerly Cass), City, University of London

Alberto Manconi

Bocconi University - Department of Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Massimo Massa

INSEAD - Finance

Date Written: January 18, 2026

Abstract

Does distrust in politically affiliated media induce a bias in investor beliefs? We study the acquisition of Dow Jones & Co. by News Corporation in 2007 as a shock to the political affiliation of Dow Jones outlets. Following the acquisition, the price of Republican- (Democrat-) aligned stocks becomes less sensitive to favorable (unfavorable) Dow Jones Newswires (DJNW) sentiment, consistent with the market attaching less credibility to a politically affiliated source. There is, however, no evidence of change in DJNW sentiment, coverage, or language about Republican/Democrat stocks, suggesting a loss of stock price informativeness. Consistent with this view, a portfolio exploiting the attenuated reaction to DJNW news earns abnormal returns following 2007.

Keywords: Politics and financial markets; trust; news analytics. *

JEL Classification: D83, G14, L82, D72

Suggested Citation

Luo, Mancy and Manconi, Alberto and Massa, Massimo, Political Affiliation and Media Distrust: Evidence from Stock Market Investors (January 18, 2026). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2879939 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2879939

Mancy Luo (Contact Author)

Bayes Business School (formerly Cass), City, University of London

106 Bunhill Row
London, EC1Y 8TZ
United Kingdom

Alberto Manconi

Bocconi University - Department of Finance ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milano, MI 20136
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://mypage.unibocconi.eu/albertomanconi/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Massimo Massa

INSEAD - Finance ( email )

Boulevard de Constance
F-77305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France
+33 1 6072 4481 (Phone)
+33 1 6072 4045 (Fax)

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