Why Do Some Insider CEOs Make More Strategic Changes Than Others? The Impact of Prior Board Experience on New CEO Insiderness
Zhu, Q., Hu, S., and Shen, W. Forthcoming. Why Do Some Insider CEOS Make More Strategic Changes than Others? The Impact of Prior Board Experience on New CEO Insiderness. Strategic Management Journal, 2020
Posted: 14 May 2020 Last revised: 20 Jul 2021
Date Written: April 19, 2020
Abstract
This study draws attention to the impact of prior board experiences on the variation in new insider CEOs’ degree of “insiderness” in terms of commitment to the status quo and their propensity to make strategic change. We theorize and find that new insider CEOs’ prior board experience at the focal firm has a negative effect on strategic change, whereas their prior board experience at other firms has a positive effect. Moreover, the positive effect of prior board experience at other firms is stronger (weaker) for new insider CEOs who have less (more) prior board experience at the focal firm. Our study contributes to upper echelons theory and research on new CEOs, and has important implications for organizational practices regarding CEO succession and strategic change.
Keywords: CEO Succession, Strategic Change, Upper Echelons Theory, Board Experience, Commitment to the Status Quo
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