Can the Unemployed Borrow? Implications for Public Insurance

78 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2020 Last revised: 7 May 2026

See all articles by J. Carter Braxton

J. Carter Braxton

University of Wisconsin-Madison - Univeristy of Wisconsin-Madison

Kyle Herkenhoff

University of Minnesota - Minneapolis

Gordon M. Phillips

Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: April 2020

Abstract

We show that unemployed individuals maintain significant access to credit. Following job loss, the unconstrained borrow, while the constrained default and delever. Both defaulters and borrowers are using credit to smooth consumption. We quantitatively show that long-term credit relationships and credit-registries allow the unemployed to partially offset income losses using credit. We estimate the model and find that the optimal provision of public insurance is unambiguously lower with greater credit access. Using a utilitarian welfare criterion, the optimal steady-state policy is to lower the replacement rate of public insurance from the current US policy of 41.2% to 38.3%. Moreover, lowering the replacement rate to 38.3% yields welfare gains to the majority of workers along the transition path.

Suggested Citation

Braxton, John and Herkenhoff, Kyle and Phillips, Gordon M., Can the Unemployed Borrow? Implications for Public Insurance (April 2020). NBER Working Paper No. w27026, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3580584

John Braxton (Contact Author)

University of Wisconsin-Madison - Univeristy of Wisconsin-Madison ( email )

1300 Linden Dr
Madison, WI 53706
United States

Kyle Herkenhoff

University of Minnesota - Minneapolis ( email )

110 Wulling Hall, 86 Pleasant St, S.E.
308 Harvard Street SE
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

Gordon M. Phillips

Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business ( email )

Hanover, NH 03755
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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