The Developed/Developing Divide on Unilateral Coercive Measures: Legitimate Enforcement or Illegitimate Intervention?

Chinese Journal of International Law, Volume 16, Issue 2, June 2017, Pages 175–214 (free access)

44 Pages Posted: 18 May 2020 Last revised: 29 Jun 2020

See all articles by Alexandra Hofer

Alexandra Hofer

Utrecht University - Faculty of Law, Economics and Governance; Utrecht University

Date Written: July 31, 2017

Abstract

Unilateral coercive measures are condemned by the UN General Assembly on a yearly basis for being contrary to international law and for having negative effects on human rights and the economy of developing States. Although legal doctrine generally finds that the limitations of economic coercion are a grey area of international law, these resolutions could be indicative of an emerging prohibition. Upon closer scrutiny, however, it would appear that they do not satisfy the required criteria — as developed by international jurisprudence and doctrine — for establishing a new custom. That being said, the resolutions clearly illustrate a divide between developed and developing States on the legitimacy of unilateral sanctions that should not be dismissed. In the interests of understanding how this division came into existence and how we can overcome it, the article proceeds to address the social factors that lead to its creation.

Keywords: coercion, unilateral sanctions, negative effects of unilateral coercive measures, non-aligned movement, G77 plus China, customary international law

Suggested Citation

Hofer, Alexandra and Hofer, Alexandra, The Developed/Developing Divide on Unilateral Coercive Measures: Legitimate Enforcement or Illegitimate Intervention? (July 31, 2017). Chinese Journal of International Law, Volume 16, Issue 2, June 2017, Pages 175–214 (free access), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3581655

Alexandra Hofer (Contact Author)

Utrecht University ( email )

Newtonlaan 201
Utrecht
Netherlands

Utrecht University - Faculty of Law, Economics and Governance ( email )

Netherlands

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