The Anatomy of the Transmission of Macroprudential Policies

70 Pages Posted: 4 Jun 2019 Last revised: 16 Nov 2021

See all articles by Viral V. Acharya

Viral V. Acharya

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business; New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Katharina Bergant

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department

Matteo Crosignani

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Tim Eisert

Nova School of Business and Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Fergal J. McCann

Central Bank of Ireland

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 12, 2021

Abstract

We analyze how regulatory constraints on household leverage—in the form of loan-to-income and loan-to-value limits—affect residential mortgage credit and house prices as well as other asset classes not directly targeted by the limits. Supervisory loan-level data suggest that mortgage credit is reallocated from low- to high-income borrowers and from urban to rural counties. This reallocation weakens the feedback loop between credit and house prices and slows down house price growth in “hot” housing markets. Banks whose lending to households is more affected by the regulatory constraint drive this stabilizing reallocation; these same banks, however, substitute their risk-taking into holdings of securities and corporate credit.

Keywords: Macroprudential Regulation, Household Leverage, Residential Mortgage Credit, House Prices

JEL Classification: G21, E21, E44, E58, R21

Suggested Citation

Acharya, Viral V. and Acharya, Viral V. and Bergant, Katharina and Crosignani, Matteo and Eisert, Tim and McCann, Fergal J., The Anatomy of the Transmission of Macroprudential Policies (November 12, 2021). Journal of Finance, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3388963 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3388963

Viral V. Acharya

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

44 West 4th Street
Suite 9-160
New York, NY NY 10012
United States
2129980354 (Phone)
2129954256 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~vacharya

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance ( email )

Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Katharina Bergant

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department ( email )

700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States

Matteo Crosignani

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( email )

33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045
United States

Tim Eisert (Contact Author)

Nova School of Business and Economics ( email )

Campus de Carcavelos
Rua da Holanda, 1
Carcavelos, 2775-405
Portugal

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Fergal J. Mccann

Central Bank of Ireland ( email )

P.O. Box 559
Dame Street
Dublin, 2
Ireland

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
547
Abstract Views
3,144
Rank
114,649
PlumX Metrics