Which Banks are (Over) Levered? Insights from Shadow Banks and Uninsured Leverage

102 Pages Posted: 21 May 2020 Last revised: 13 Sep 2023

See all articles by Erica Xuewei Jiang

Erica Xuewei Jiang

UCLA Anderson

Gregor Matvos

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

Tomasz Piskorski

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Amit Seru

Stanford University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 25, 2020

Abstract

We examine why banks maintain such high financial leverage, with debt financing accounting for about 90% of banks' assets. To answer this question, we use uniquely assembled data on capital structure decisions of shadow banks that on the asset side conduct very similar business to banks. The shadow bank data provides us with a window into "free market" financing choices of financial intermediaries that unlike banks are lightly regulated and do not have access to insured deposit funding. We demonstrate that shadow banks employ twice the amount of equity capital compared to equivalent banks, with the most significant disparity observed between smaller and mid-size banks. Uninsured leverage, defined as uninsured debt funding to assets, increases with size for both banks and shadow banks while cost of debt declines with size. We rationalize these facts within a calibrated quantitative equilibrium model of intermediation. Our analysis reveals that the primary driver of high leverage among smaller and mid-size banks is their access to insured deposit funding. In the absence of deposit insurance, these banks would maintain a capitalization level at least 25% higher in relative terms than observed in the data. Conversely, deposit insurance plays a comparatively minor role in influencing the financial leverage of the largest banks, where the predominant factor is their capacity to generate money-like deposits. These results suggest a significant scope for the increase of capitalization of smaller and mid-size banks to align their capital structures with their private market counterparts. The aggregate consequences of such increase would be limited, because of reallocation of lending activity from smaller to large banks and to shadow banks.

Keywords: Shadow Banks, Banking, Capital Requirements, Leverage, Fragility, Equity September 2019. This paper was previously titled "Banking without Deposits: Evidence from Shadow Bank Call Reports."

JEL Classification: G2, L5

Suggested Citation

Jiang, Erica Xuewei and Matvos, Gregor and Piskorski, Tomasz and Seru, Amit, Which Banks are (Over) Levered? Insights from Shadow Banks and Uninsured Leverage (March 25, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3584191 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3584191

Gregor Matvos

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

Tomasz Piskorski

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Amit Seru (Contact Author)

Stanford University ( email )

367 Panama St
Stanford, CA 94305
United States

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