Ownership of IT Assets in Procurement Systems

38 Pages Posted: 13 Jul 2006 Last revised: 30 Apr 2020

See all articles by Kunsoo Han

Kunsoo Han

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management

Robert Kauffman

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management

Barrie R. Nault

University of Calgary - Haskayne School of Business

Abstract

With the rapid growth of business-to-business electronic commerce and the increasing need for supply chain collaboration, systems that support supply procurement are becoming ever more important. Due to the substantial costs of hardware, software and effort needed for implementation success, firms that participate in developing e-procurement systems want to reap as much value as possible. We use the theory of incomplete contracts to understand the different ways to organize the ownership of IT assets in procurement systems across two or more firms. The purpose is to maximize the value that the participants can appropriate and give them the proper incentives to invest. Based on the theory, we investigate the primary determinants of optimal ownership for e-procurement systems, focusing on the relative importance of participants' investments, which is a measure of the marginal value that each participant adds to any proposed ownership structure for the IT assets. We also provide a framework for analyzing e-procurement system ownership structures. We apply our approach to vendor managed inventory systems, as an illustration of the range of e-procurement systems ownership settings that we can treat with this theoretical perspective.

Keywords: Economic theory, e-procurement systems, incomplete contracts, IT investments, interorganizational IS, ownership, systems implementation, supply chain management, vendor managed inventory.

Suggested Citation

Han, Kunsoo and Kauffman, Robert and Nault, Barrie R., Ownership of IT Assets in Procurement Systems. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=914219 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.914219

Kunsoo Han

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management ( email )

19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
612-626-9283 (Phone)

Robert Kauffman

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management ( email )

19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
612-624-8562 (Phone)
612-626-1316 (Fax)

Barrie R. Nault (Contact Author)

University of Calgary - Haskayne School of Business ( email )

2500 University Drive, NW
Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4
Canada

HOME PAGE: http://ucalgary.ca/bnault

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
171
Abstract Views
1,513
Rank
440,151
PlumX Metrics